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The physicist Leo Szilard once announced to his friend
.Hans Bethe that he was thinking of keeping a diary :
'I don't intend to publish it; I am merely going to
record the facts for the information of God.' 'Don't
you think God knows the facts?' Bethe asked. 'Yes',
said Szilard. 'He knows the facts, but he does not
know this version of the facts. '
Freeman Dyson, Disturbing the Universe (Preface)
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The application of the methods of the social sciences to educational research
has had an interesting outcome in that educational research has absorbed two
mainstream competing views of the social sciences - the traditional 'positi-
vistic ' view and the more recent 'interpretivist ' view. The former holds
inter alia that there is no difference between the social sciences and the
natural sciences and is therefore concerned with discovering the universal
laws that regulate and determine individual and social behaviour. The latter
view, however, examines the processes of construction of realities by people.
The author is fully aware of recent developments in the philosophy of science,
in that an anti-positivist form of naturalism has developed which cannot strictly
be classified as interpretivist. This movement is often referred to as
characteristic of a post-positivist phase which tries to effect a synthesis
in the positivist/anti-positivist debate preceding this phase. (1) Exponents
are for instance Bhaskar, Urry, Keat and Harre. For the purpose of this
dissertation, however, we are not going to deal with this development, as
a study of present research output in education reflects that the debate
is still very much located in the positivist/anti-positivist phase.
The two contending views viz. positivism-antipositivism have different ways
of looking at social reality, and hence their manner of interpreting it
and their corresponding reflections in educational research are strikingly
different. We will examine briefly the assumptions underpinning these two
approaches and will base our initial analysis on the work of Burrell and
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Morgan who identified four sets of such assumptions in order to illustrate
the problem at hand. (2)
1.1 Assumptions about the nature of social science
The different approaches to social science are underwritten by philosophical
assumptions which are subsumed in epistemology, ontology, human nature and
methodology, and have direct implications of a methodological nature. The
approaches of social scientists are shaped by their assumptions about the
nature of the social world and the ways in which it may be investigated.
Assumptions of an ontological nature concern the question of 'reality' :
should 'reality' be investigated as something external to man, as a given
'out there'; or is 'reality' the product of individual consciousness?
Closely interrelated with these ontological assumptions are assumptions
of an epistemological nature which entail ideas involving the grounds of
knowledge: how does one distinguish between what is 'true' and what is
'false'? The dichotomy of 'true' and 'false' presupposes an epistemological
stance and concerns issues related with the nature of knowledge itself:
whether knowledge can be acquired or whether it is based on personal experience
and is essentially subjective in nature.
Methodology we will regard as an encompassing term denoting the logic of
the movement through ontological, epistemological and strategy development
towards a research problem.
The philosophical debate between so-called determinists and voluntarists
has its roots in the assumptions concerning human nature. The "deterministic"
perspective in the social sciences sees human beings as conditioned and
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controlled by their environment and as responding in a mechanistic fashion
to the external world. The voluntarist perspective has at its centre the
concept of the 'free will' of man and regards human beings very much as
the creators and controllers of their environment.
We have stated above that the philosophical assumptions underwriting the
different approaches to social science have implications of a methodological
nature in that they have consequences for the way in which social scientists
attempt to investigate and obtain 'knowledge ' of the social world. Metho-
dologies which subscribe to the view that the social world can be treated
like the natural world regard knowledge as external to man and therefore
attempt to discover the objective, universal laws which can explain the
reality being observed.
Methodologies which subscribe to an alternative view viz. that knowledge
has a personal and subjective quality, are concerned with the ways in which
individuals create, modify and interpret the world, and is thus concerned
with the unique and particular, rather than with the general and universal.
These approaches question the existence of an external reality and emphasize
the relativistic nature of the social world.
Our brief sketch of the various ontological, epistemological, and methodological
assumptions underlying the different approaches in social science research
highlights two broad and polarised perspectives: the subjective - objective
perspectives which have characterized debates in social philosophy. It is
this subjective-objective dimension which has formed the basis of the various
research paradigms in the social sciences and which has generated different
concepts and analytical tools for the analysis of social phenomena.
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1.2 Positivist and Interpretivist Paradigms
The conventional inquiry paradigm which we will refer to as the 'positivistic'
paradigm, is the most prominent in social science research today. It emerged
from the growth of positivism which has been defined as "a family of philo-
sophies characterized by an extremely positive evaluation of science and
scientific method." (3) Positivism had a major impact in reforming scientific
method and its concepts provided a new rationale for the actual doing of
science. Positivist epistemology is based upon traditional approaches of
the natural sciences. It tries to establish regularities and causal rela-
tionships between the constituent elements of the social world in order to
explainanct predict what happens in it, The growth of knowledge is seen
to be a cumulative process in that new insights are added to the existing
stock of knowledge.
In the last twenty years, the growth of interpretive or micro social theories
has challenged the epistemological assumptions of positivist or macro theories.
Micro theories reject the notion that science can generate objective knowledge
of any kind. (4) Social science is seen to be an inter-subjective enterprise
in that the social world is essentially relativistic and can only be understood
by occupying the frame of reference of the individuals who are directly involved
in the phenomenon being studied. These micro approaches differ markedly
in theoretical background and we will examine briefly their origins and
intellectual traditions.
The interpretive paradigm attempts to explain and understand the social world
from the point of view of the actors who are directly involved in the social
process. Its history is rooted in the German idealist tradition which grew
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out of inter alios the work of Immanuel Kant (1724-1803) who postulated
that a priori knowledge is independent of any external reality and as such,
it has to precede any understanding of the sense data of empirical knowledge.
Inherent in man's consciousness are in-born organizing principles by which
man structures and arranges sense data and thus understands. Central to
Kant's philosophy are the ideas of 'mind' and 'intuition'.
However, it is the works of Dilthey, Husserl and Weber which have played
a decisive role in shaping the interpretive paradigm. Some major categories
of the interpretive theory are phenomenology, phenomenological sociology and
hermeneutics. (5) In phenomenology, we distinguish between the transcendental
phenomenology of Husserl, and the social phenomenology of Schutz. In social
thought we identify two branches which are closely related to phenomenology
but which combine the phenomenological perspective with other elements. These
branches are ethnomethodology which derives from the phenomenology of Schutz,
and symbolic interactionism which incorporates the work of G.H. Mead from
a pragmatist perspective. (6)
Social science research which applies a natural science approach to social
phenomena and which is based on the positivist paradigm, is often commonly
referred to as "quantitative" research methodology. (7) Criteria which
determine this research approach are for example objectivity, replicability,
causa1ity etcetera. Proponents of a so-ca 11 ed "qua1itat i ve" research metho-
dology which is based on the interpretivist paradigm, attack positivistic
social science on the grounds that social science, unli§e natural science,
'stands in a subject - subject relation to its "field of study", not a
su~ject-object relation; it deals with a pre-interpreted world in which the
meanings developed by active subjects actually enter into the actual constitution
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or production of that world.' (8) In contrast to quantitative research
methodology, the epistemological principles of qualitative research methodology
have yielded research.methods which focus on the lived experience of people.
Examples of techniques used are unstructured interviews and participant
observation. The main problem that has to be confronted in this regard
is whether the assumptions underlying quantitative and qualitative methodologies
and their respective research techniques, are mutually exclusive categories
in an epistemological sense. However, one finds in social science research
several advocates of 'triangulation' or the 'multi method approach ' who
argue that a combination of quantitative and qualitative research techniques
will minimize the disadvantages inherent in anyone or more method, and
maximize the possibility that the final product will reflect the diversity
inherent in human communities. (9)
1.3 Complementary methodologies: The problem of triangulation
Cohen and Manion define triangulation as the use of two or more methods
to collect data in the study of some aspect of human behaviour. (10) It
is argued that since research methods act as filters through which the
environment is experienced, they can never be neutral or atheoretical in
representing the world of experience. (11)
It is also possible that reliance on a single method may distort the researcher's
picture of the reality he is investigating. (12) In the light of these
two observations, it is argued that the use of methods which contrast with
each other will result in the researcher having increased confidence in his
findings especially if the different methods of data collection yield sub-
stantially the same results. The use of contrasting methods will also reduce
the chances that any consistent findings are attributeble to similarities
of method.
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Another advantage attributed to the use of triangular techniques is that
it overcomes the problem of 'method-boundedness.' (13) Boring states:
as long as a new construct has only the single operational definition
that it received at birth, it is just a construct. When it gets two
alternative operational definitions, it is beginning to be validated.
When the defining operations, because of proven correlations are many,
then it becomes reified. (14)
Denzin cites four types of triangulation: data, investigator, theoretical
and methodological. (15) There are three main kinds of data viz .. time,
space, and person. Time-triangulation makes use of cross-sectional approaches
where data is collected from different groups at one point in time, and of
longitudinal approaches where data is collected from the same group at different
points in time. Thus time-triangulation takes into account social change
and process. Space-triangulation involves the use of data from a variety
of locations in an attempt to overcome the limitations of studies which are
conducted within one culture or sub-culture. In person-triangulation, the
three levels of analysis adopted by social science researchers are the indi-
vidual, the group and society. One who person-triangulates will use data
from two or more levels of aggregation.
Investigator triangulation refers to the use of several individual observers
to study the same phenomenon. The use of two or more observers or participants
independently can lead to more valid and reliable data.
Denzin identifies two categories of methodological triangulation:
'(a) within-method triangulation applies to the use of variations in the
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measurement process e.g. the inclusion of two different measuring
instruments in a single questionnaire; and
(b) between-method triangulation which refers to measures of a single
characteristic or relationship obtained in two or more different modes
of data collection. (16)
Thus far, we have outlined the principles of triangulation and described
the types of triangulation and their characteristics. Four categories of
Denzin's typology have been used in educational research. These are:
time-triangulation with its longitudinal and cross-sectional studies; space-
triangulation e.g. when a number of schools in the same area or across the
country are investigated in some way; investigator triangulation e.g. when
a group of inspectors report on a school or a sample of schools; and metho-
dological triangulation which is frequently used in educational research.
Cohen and Manion suggest that triangulation will be relevant where complex
phenomena have to be explained. They use the example of a comparative
study of a formal and an informal classroom to illustrate this point of view
and point out that due to the contrasting philosophies, objectives and practices
in the two classes, a single method approach would have a very limited value
in reflecting the "more subtle, intangible features and the non-academic
factors distinguishing the two classrooms." (17) However, if the researchers
adopt a multi-method approach combining academic criteria (achievement tests,
record cards, assessment of class work) and non-academic factors (attitudes
of children and teachers, relationships, interview data and observations
by the researcher), a more realistic view will be generated allowing inves-
tigators to discuss them on a comparative basis.
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The authors discuss other occasions when triangulation will be appropriate
in educational research e.g. when a more holistic view of educational out-
comes is sought; when different methods of teaching have to be evaluated
and when controversial aspects of education need to be more fully explained.
With regard to the problems of how methods are to be selected and how the
data is to be used, Cohen and Manion suggest the following:
(a) The selection of methods depends on the kind of information required
and the context of the research. If the researcher wishes to generalize
his findings to wider populations, statistical data will be most efficient.
If, however, he requires information of a personal or phenomenological
perspective, interviews will be more successful in yielding such data.
(b) The authors list achievement tests, personality tests, attitude tests
and sociometric tests as yielding quantitative data; and participant
observation, interviewing and teachers' assessments as yielding non-
quantifiable data. Depending on the type of information the researcher
is seeking, he must combine and complement the most appropriate methods
and sources to "build up as full a picture of the areas he is inves-
tigating as time and facilities permit." (18)
Cohen and Manion are of the opinion that the combined methods approach breaks
down the traditional barriers between positivistic and interpretivist approaches.
However, they offer no directives regarding the question of how the methods
are to be combined, explaining that the answer depends on the particular
situation, the objectives of the study, and the weightings which the researcher
assigns to the methods providing him with data.
The authors identify two kinds of problems which arise from the question of
')
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how the data is to be used. With quantifiable data, the researcher has
to impose some kind of meaning in line with a theory or hypothesis; whereas
with qualitative or interpretive data, meanings and explanations have to
be drawn from the data themselves. The problems facing the researcher stem
from the inconsistencies between quantified measures arising from weaknesses
in available measuring instruments, and the differences between quantifiable
and qualitative data or between different sets of qualitative data. The
solution to the first problem is, according to Cohen and Manion, a more refined
and valid instrumentation; the solution to the second problem is "an imaginative
leap." There is a possibility that the solution to the second problem can
result in discrepant sets of data being presented in "the form of a collage".
However, the authors accept that it cannot be expected that complete consensus
among data can or should be achieved. We note with interest the following
statement made by Cohen and Manion :
"Indeed, the very burden of the interpretive approach is that different
actors in a situation will have different meanings and that each meaning
is equally valid. I' (19)
This discussion brings us back to the main problem as stated earlier viz.
Whether the assumptions underlying quantitative and.qualitative methodologies
and their respective research techniques, are mutually exclusive categories
in an epistemological sense. In our explanation of triangulation, we discussed
the views of some social scientists who are of the opinion that if quan-
titative and qualitative research are seen as complementary to each other
and are mixed in research of many kinds, the gap in the traditional dichotomy
between quantitative and qualitative research would be bridged. However,
it has become evident to us that in the various discussions about these two
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methodologies, technical and epistemological issues are being confused, and
that the epistemological roots of these paradigms are merely being 'glossed
over' in actual research practice. In the words of Bryman, discussions
about the two methodologies "are being explicated at an epistemological level
and an attempt is then made to establish a link between it and a technical
level, i.e. the practice of social research." (20) In our next section,
we hope that this point will reveal itself more clearly.
1.4 The neglect of epistemological roots in contemporary research paradigms
In recent discussions about the two methodologies, reference is sometimes made
to the term 'paradigm' in order to reinforce the epistemological nature of the
discussion and to denote the two traditions. (21) It is clear that two divergent
epistemological bases are being expounded and that the question of techniques of
investigation is considered in terms of the technique's appropriateness
in terms of a particular set of epistemological premises. Hence, proponents
of qualitative methodology justify their preference for participant observation
and quantitative researchers theirs for the social survey by referring to
their respective intellectual traditions.
Research practices which are chosen for their 'appropriateness' are being
linked with abstract philosophical issues. However, philosophical deliberations
in recent years do not subscribe to the view that it is the problem that
determines the use of a particular technique. It is argued that problems
are formulated within the context of a prior intellectual commitment to
a philosophical position. (22)
We note that in the debate about quantitative and qualitative research,
the terms 'quantitative' and 'qualitative' are taken as reference points
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for the intellectual traditions. But, we ask, are the presence or absence
of these types of data manifestations of the underlying epistemological
issues? Do they in fact signify the philosophical commitments for which
they are presumed to stand? We will attempt to answer these questions by
examining briefly the issues concerning technique and epistemology.
We have pointed out that questions of research technique are taken to be
systematically related to epistemological issues. Trow's view that problems
determine methods indicates that one technique may be more appropriate in
some contexts than another and thus cannot claim to be superior to it's
alternatives. (23) Trow has therefore made reference to a technical rather
than an epistemological issue. Other examples of 'technical' arguments
demarcating particular methods as 'appropriate' or 'inappropriate' can be
found in thewritinqs of Zelditch, and Warwick and Lininger. (24) Arguments
of this nature are tied up with the researcher's views about technical viability,
and as such, are "qu ite distinct from philosophical debates which argue
for the superiority of a particular epistemological bedrock from which
considerations of method then emerge." (25)
In the recent mode of discussing methods of investigation in terms of
appropriate knowledge bases, there is sometimes evidence of a vacillation
between an epistemological level and a technical level. We will examine
briefly some areas in which this is revealed
(a) Supporters of qualitative methodology argue that its techniques are
more sensitive to the complexities of social phenomena, unlike the
techniques of quantitative methodology which do not promote an
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understanding of the contextual significance of the complexities under-
lying social phenomena. An example of this form of reasoning can be found
in an article by Light, a supporter of qualitative methodology. (26) In the
article, he attacks the Coleman Report, a quantitative research survey which
concluded that the schools children attend are poor predictors of achievement. (2
Light compares this study with:
a recent study from England (28) ... systematically observed students
in schools and came to very different conclusions. With richer, more
holistic data it found that schools made an enormous difference in
the proportion of students who passed national exams or got arrested
for delinquency... While the investigators collected output data,
they also went into the schools to find out what social processes ly
lay behind the successes and failures of the contrast. In contrast
to the wastefully expensive Coleman Report, which tried to analyse
a training programme by isolating a few variables from the whole,
the British study examined the whole and discovered key dimensions
of educational programs that only systematic observations over time
could discover. (29)
Light's comparison is disconcerting in that it reveals that the different
results of the two studies seem to be attributable to the different
research techniques employed. A problem arises: how is one to 'know'
which of the two studies is the 'correct' analysis? Light favours
qualitative studies perhaps because it yields "richer" data, but one
can ask what does this have to do with the clash between positivism
and phenomenology? It appears to us that Light's preference for quali-
tative study seems to be based upon technical rather than epistemological
criteria because the different philosophical bases of the two methodologies
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play no part in answering the question of the appropriateness of one
technique against another in solving a research problem. However,
as Bryman states, "if the research problem is one which directly
emanates from a particular epistemological position then the question
of the appropriateness of a research technique is significant, for
the technique must properly reflect the epistemological framework in
which the research is embedded." (30)
(b) We are of the opinion that the proponents of triangulation, which we
have discussed already in some detail, are also guilty of confusing
technical and epistemological issues. The argument for a combination
of the strengths of different techniques in social science research
is essentially a technical one as it implies that such a combination
of quantitative and qualitative techniques would produce a better
overall view of reality, and as such a superior piece of research.
Several writers who acknowledge the distinctiveness of the two methodologies
in philosophical terms, make recommendations for a combination of the two.
For example :-
(i) Whyte asserts: "My strategy calls for a weaving back and forth among
methods through the various stages of research." (31)
(ii) Douglas states: "Since all research methods have costs and benefits,
and since they differ greatly in their particular costs and benefits,
a researcher generally finds it best to use some combination or mixture
of methods." (32)
(iii) Van Maanen asserts that "qualitative and quantitative are not mutually
exclusive." (33)
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Statements such as the above illustrate that the writers are considering
technical and not epistemological issues in social science research. The
arguments for triangulating research techniques suggest that at the technical
level, the quantitative - qualitative distinction is an artificial one. But
at the epistemological level, the picture is quite different. Consider,
for example, the following statement:
When we speak of 'quantitative' or 'qualitative l methodologies, we are, in
the final analyses speaking of an interrelated set of assumptions about the
social world which are philosophical, ideological and epistemological.
They encompass more than simply data gathering techniques. (34)
Following from this statement, we would like to make the point that even though
it may appear that at the technical level the debate between quantitative and
qualitative methodologies is reconciled by combining and/or triangulating
research techniques, such 'reconciliation' does not seem possible at the
epistemological level. This is so because the underlying tenets of positivism
and phenomenology, to use an example of the two major philosophical strands,
have fundamentally different views about the relationship between knowledge
and reality. To support our view we refer to Snizek (35) who, in his analysis
of journal articles, has shown that research techniques cannot be directly
extrapolated from a knowledge of a researcher's epistemological assumptions;
and to Marsh (36) who, in his attempts to distinguish philosophical issues
from technical ones, questions whether the survey technique is inherently
positivistic.
We maintain that many of the writers we have mentioned have confused epis-
temological issues with technical issues in their attempts to relate questions
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of method to philosophical debates. It is our view that in the light of
this confusion and especially because of the 'explosion l in qualitative
literature in recent years, we need to subject to considerable investigation
the philosophical underpinnings of both "quantitative" and "qual itative"
methodologies. We hope that such an investigation will help make clearer
our research perspectives in the social sciences, particularly in educational
research.
With this objective in mind, we will proceed as follows: In Chapter two
we will trace the rise of positivism in the social sciences and examine the
tension it generated with the dialectical and phenomenological trends in
philosophical thought. In Chapter three we will discuss how the development
of symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology posed a threat to positivist
domination in social science research. Chapter four will entail a discussion
of the present position in educational research methodology. In Chapter five
we will examine firstly the sociology of knowledge and the sociology of science,
and then relate our discussion to the positivist and interpretivist traditions
in educational research. Our intention in the last chapter is to show that the
fundamentally different views which the two major philosophical strands have
about the nature of knowledge and about what is to pass as warr9ntable knowledge,
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CHAPTER TWO
THE HISTORY OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
2.1 Introductory Remarks
Written from different perspectives, several attempts at comprehensive histories
of the field of social science have been made for more than a decade.(1) We will
attempt to trace the main philosophical themes underlying social thought which
were built into the various research paradigms in the social sciences. Present
day research paradigms in the social sciences have been shaped to a great extent
by the encounter of the social sciences with the phenomenal advances of natural
science and technology in the late 18th and 19th centuries. However, it must
be pointed out that it would not be true to say that the methods of the natural
sciences were uncritically adopted by all social scientists to form a basis
for a model for social thought. For example, idealism in social philosophy
maintained its distance from the intellectual standpoints of the natural sciences,
and was distrustful of and sometimes hostile to the claims of the natural
sciences, especially in terms of the latter's possibility of creating a science
of society.
The influence of Comte however, proved to be fundamental for the development
of sociological method since he IIregarded the extension of science to the study
of human conduct in society as a direct outcome of the progressive march of
human understanding towards man himself. 1I (2) Comte therefore attempted to
bring into being a science of society which would have the same kind of
explanatory power as the natural s~iences in the study of human conduct.
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In this chapter we will sketch briefly some of the main points of contention
between the central tenets of the positivist tradition and anti-positivist
traditions in the philosophy of science. We will then examine in detail the
philosophical underpinnings of the positivist, dialectical and phenomenological
trends in the development of the social sciences with a view to highlighting
epistemological problems presently faced by the social sciences in terms of
establishing what can be regarded legitimately as IIknowledge ll •
2.2 Two Traditional Views of Scientific Inquiry
According to Von Wright, scientific inquiry is broadly speaking said to be
present in two main aspects :
1. the ascertaining and discovering of facts (descriptive science).
2. the construction of hypotheses and theories (theoretical science).
One of the purposes of theory-building is to predict the occurrence of events
or outcomes of experiments and thus anticipate new facts. The other purpose
is to explain facts which have already been recorded. However, the discovery
and description of facts cannot always be conceptually separated from a theory
about them and is often an important step towards an understanding of their
nature. (3) Prediction and explanation differ only in the time perspective
prediction looks forward from what is to what will come; and explanation
looks back from what is to what went before. The former are some facts, the
latter is a law. One can challenge this view of explanation and prediction
by questioning the role of general laws in scientific explanation and to raise
the problem of whether theory-building is intrinsically the same endeavour
in the natural sciences and in the humanistic and social disciplines. (4)
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It is useful to consider some of the problems concerning the interrelation
of description, explanation, prediction and theory in the light of intellectual
history. The two main traditions in the history of ideas - the aristotelian
and the galilean - differ as to the conditions an explanation has to satisfy
in order to be scientifically acceptable. The contrast between the two
traditions, with regard to their view of scientific explanation, is usually
characterised as causal versus teleological. The first type of explanation
is also called mechanistic, the second finalistic. (5)
By the 19th century natural science was already established on the intellectual
stage. Humanistic studies with a scientific claim were newcomers. Thus one
of the chief issues of nineteenth-century methodology and philosophy of science
concerned the relationship between these two main branches of empirical inquiry.
One of the stands in the philosophy of science viz. positivism, to use an
umbrella term, subscribes to the following tenets:
1. Methodological monism, or the idea of the unity of scientific method
amidst the diversity of subject matter of scientific investigation. (6)
2. The exact natural sciences, in particular mathematical physics, set
a methodological ideal or standard which measures the degree of develop-
ment and perfection of all other sciences, including the humanities. (7)
3. This contains the view of scientific explanation which is, in a broad
sense, 'causal'. Individual cases are subsumed under hypothetically
assumed general laws of nature, including 'human nature'. (8)
Although it is possible to derive such main tenets from positivist approaches,
this does not necessarily imply that diverse-trends do not exist. The reaction
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against positivism, viz. antipositivism, became prominent towards the end
of the nineteenth-century. It is probably a more diversified and heterogeneous
trend than positivism. It is also characterized by the names "idealism" (which
is appropriate for only some facets of this trend), and "hermeneutics". Repre-
sentatives of this trend of thought include eminent German' philosophers, his-
torians and social scientists e.g. Droysen, Dilthey, Simmel, Max Weber and
Windelband.
The exponents of anti-positivism would reject the methodological monism of
positivism and refuse to view the pattern set by the exact natural sciences
as the sole and supreme ideal for a rational understanding of reality. Many
of these exponents emphasize a contrast between those sciences which, like
physics or chemistry or physiology, aim at generalisations about reproducible
and predictable phenomena, and those which, like history, want to grasp the
individual and unique features of their objects.
The antipositivists attacked the positivist view of explanation. A methodo-
logical dichotomy was introduced by the German historian - philosopher Droysen.
He coined for it the names "Erklaren" (explanation) and "Verstehen" (understanding:
(9) The aim of the natural sciences, he said, is to explain; the aim of
history is to understand the phenomena which fall within its domain. Wilhelm
Dilthey then systematically worked out these methodological ideas and used
the name "Geisteswissenschaften" for the entire domain of the understanding
method. (10)
There is no sharp distinction between the words 'explain' and 'understand '
in ordinary usage. Explanations do further our understanding of things. But
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'understanding ' has a psychological ring which lexplanation ' has not. Several
nineteenth-century antipositivist methodologists, especially Simmel, emphasized
this psychological feature. Simmel thought that understanding as a method
characteristic of the humanities is a form of empathy (in German IEinfUhlung")
or re-creation in the mind of the scholar of the mental atmosphere, the thoughts
and feelings and motivations, of the objects of his study.
Understanding is connected with intentionality in a way explanation is not.
One understands the aims and purposes of an agent, the meaning of a sign or
symbol, and the significance of a social institution or religious rite. This
intentionalistic or semantic dimension of understanding is playing a prominent
role in more recent methodological discussion. (11)
There is thus a fundamental methodological cleavage between the natural sciences
and the historical "Geisteswissenschaften". The question therefore arises
of where the social and behavioural sciences stand. As both were born under a
cross pressure of positivist and anti-positivist tendencies in the last century,
they have become a battleground for the two opposed trends in the philosophy
of scientific method.
The methodological unity-or not- of natural and social science has been a
continuing central debate within the philosophy of the social sciences. (12)
Despite the fact that positivists have dictated the way in which the methodological
unity issue has been debated, there are a number of different conceptions
of science which should be explored as appropriate frameworks for the social
sciences.
Without categorizing too stringently at this stage, it is however necessary to
trace the philosophical roots of these movements in the social sciences.
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2.3 The Rise of Positivism in the Social Sciences
A central feature of nineteenth-century French social thought was the
restoration of a new form of social order in which the individual would be
subordinated to a higher social totality. A new positive outlook, or Positive
Philosophy, was advocated by Saint-Simon, Comte and the Positivist Movement
in general. (13) This outlook was to be founded on the certainties of
science. The eighteenth-century Enlightenment had brought about the need for
a new basis of moral, intellectual and social life. The positivists felt that
this basis could be provided by the methods, findings and instrumental utility
of science.
Comte and Saint-Simon took up the concept of society as an organic whole. (14)
Comte acquired from Montesquieuthe notion that like natural phenomena, social
phenomena are subject to general laws. The Cours begins with Comte1s announce-
ment of his discovery of a fundamental law: "This law is that each of our
principal conceptions, each branch of our knowledge, passes successively through
three different theoretical states: the theological or fictitious, the meta-
physical or abstract, and the scientific or positive." (15)
His arguments rest on two central theses. As pointed out in the above law,
there is historically a progression from theological, to metaphysical, to
positive modes of thought and related types of social organization. Comte
maintains that there is a hierarchy of sciences with mathematics at the bottom.
Sociology occupies the position at the top. Each of the sciences passes in
turn through the three stages - theological, metaphysical and positive.
In the theological stage people explain events and phenomena in terms of
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supernatural forces such as particular gods or spirits; in the metaphysical
stage, all phenomena are explained in terms of abstract forces or personified
entities; and in the positive stage, explanations are given by the establishment
of regular law-like connections between empirically observable phenomena. (16)
Judging from the last stage, it is clear that the positivist is concerned
mainly with observable phenomena. Facts have to be carefully accumulated and
then used to establish law-like relations between the observable phenomena.
Observation, experimentation, comparison and prediction are the means to
establish these relations. Implicit in this view is the belief that we can
know only observable phenomena and the relations between them. We cannot have
knowledge of anything else.
We can distinguish between scientific and non-scientific statements in terms
of their testability. Statements are only properly scientific if they are
open to empirical control and if they have predictive consequences that can
be tested. According to Comte, every law-like connection "discovered between
any two phenomena enables us both to explain them and forsee them, each by
means of the other." (17) He claims also that "any proposition which is not
strictly reducible to the simple enunciation of the fact - either particular
or general - can have no real or intelligible meaning for us." (18)
Thus the positivist approach is distinguishable from theology or metaphysics
in the sense that for the positivist, a meaningful statement is one which can
be checked, tested and refuted. Science has to organize isolated facts into
sets of laws. The value of scientific theories "depends entirely on their
confonnity with the phenomena." Thus it would seem that Comte does not consider
as important how scientific theories are arrived at. (19)
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We will now examine the role of scientific theories in Comte1s positivist
philosophy of science. He contends that we construct hypotheses which are
then tested against our observations. (20) Reality can be attributed only
to observable phenomena. It is interesting to note that counter to his
positivism, Comte also holds to a pragmatist view of science in so far as he
claims that practical applicability is the main basis of positive knowledge
He sees science as an instrument of control over our physical and social
conditions. Science provides us with factual knowledge which directly implies
changes in our belief, values and principles of social organization. Thus
true, or positive, knowledge must have practicaL use to people in their
day-to-day lives. Those sectors of science which lack practical exploitation
e.g. the theory of evolution or the theory of probability etc., are rejected
as metaphysical.
Any knowledge which is general, simple and independent of other sciences reaches
the positive stage. Since sociology is none of these in that it is complicated,
individual and dependent on the sciences, it will be the last to reach that
stage. Sociology is not reducible to other sciences although it depends on
them for empirical data and development of their methodologies. Comte suggests
that in order to study society we should view each element in the light of
the whole. The objective of social statics is to ~tudy the constituent parts
of the different forms of social order and their relationships. Social dynamics
aims to discover the general laws governing the overall development of human
societies and ultimately of the human species itself.
Comte advocates that we use the historical method in the latter case. This
involves a comparison between successive states of human development. This
method would reveal to us the laws of the inevitable transition from one to
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another. Sociology uses the methods of theOther sciences: observation (as
in astronomy), experimentation (as in physics), and comparison (as in biology).
The historical method is a subcategory of the method of comparison.
Comte advocates that it is convenient to study the whole prior to the indivi-
dual elements or parts since the whole society is more accessible and better
known to us. One can question however, whether it is possible for us to
'observe' society. What we can, in fact, observe, are only the various features,
elements and consequences.
2.4 Dialectic Trends
In examining the dialectical trends in the philosophy of science, we will
concern ourselves mainly with the views of JUrgen Habermas as representing
a contemporary neo-Marxist stance.
According to Habermas, the relation of theory and practice in the major tradition
of philosophy, always referred to the good and righteous and to the life of
individuals and citizens. However, since the eighteenth-century, theory now
deals with "the objective, overall complex of development of a human species
which produces itself, which is as yet only destined to attain its essence:
Humanity." (21)
In KnowZedge and Human Interests, Habermas accepts a central
feature of Marx's epistemology viz. the attempt to relate the foundations of
knowledge to fundamental characteristics of the human species. (22) Habermas
contends that there are three distinctive forms of knowledge which are involved
in the empirical - analytic sciences, the historical - hermeneutic sciences,
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and in self-reflection. Each form is constituted by a separate 'knowledge -
constitutive interest' which are, respectively, the technical, the practical
and the emancipatory.
The empirical-analytic sciences include the natural sciences, economics
sociology and political science. These aim to discover nomological knowledge
about natural and social relations. Their claim to status as knowledge is
justified by their interest in technical control i.e. their interest in
increasing the possible extent of human domination over natural and social
reality. We require the information provided by these sciences for rational,
feedback-controlled instrumental activity.
It is necessary for us to examine what Habermas means by 'technical interest'
and in what sense this interest is 'constitutive' of knowledge. According to
Habermas, scientists are not typically motivated in their enquiries by the
intention to discover laws that can be used for instrumental control. The
technical interest is related to a characteristic of the manner in which the
human species historically transforms itself: the human species reproduces
itself biologically and culturally by productive activity upon nature i.e.
labour. Thus productive activity requires and generates a 'specific interest'
in technical control. (23)
TechnicaZ interest constitutes knowledge on two related levels. First, it
provides a criterion for what is to count as 'real' or what counts as an 'object'.
The 'real' is what can be detected, measured and manipulated in the situation
of controlled experiments. In these situations information is received through
our perceptual mechanisms. Second, the general character of the standards
employed in determining the truth or falsity of statements about these objects,
is determined by the technical interest e.g. the standard of falsification which
rejects statements whose predictive consequences are unsuccessful. (24)
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Habermas holds that as our civilization becomes increasingly scientific,
industrially advanced society bases its survival on expanding its technical
control of nature and using social organization to refine the administration
of human beings and their relations to one another. The relationship of
theory and practice has become the rational application of techniques assured
by empirical science, which, together with the analytical sciences, make
technical recommendations, but do not provide answers to practical questions.
Socially effective theory is now directed to the behaviour of human beings
who manipulate.
Habermas maintains that the criteria of reality and standards of validity
in the empirical - analytic sciences are relative to the interest in technical
control. There are however, other characteristics of the human species which
are non-technical. There are thus other distinctive forms of knowledge which
have their own criteria of reality and validity. Hence, the historical-
hermeneutic sciences which are constituted by the practical interest. In
these sciences the objects, or what is real, are inter-subjectively established
meanings. Interpretation is their criteria of validity e.g. the interpretive
understanding of linguistic communication. Communicative interaction cannot
be reduced to other categories. The historical-hermeneutic sciences fail to
define their objects and criteria of validity in the manner of the empirical-
analytic sciences. They cannot be criticized for this failure as they involve
a distinctive form of knowledge that is constituted by the practical interest.
Emancipatory interest constitutes the third form of knowledge. This interest
which Habermas terms lMUndigkeit" is an interest in human autonomy and responsibil
Self-reflection is an important aspect of this form of knowledge which is
itself involved in critical theory. It is now necessary for us to examine
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Habermas· opposition to 'positivism'. His central criticism is that
positivism cannot account for the epistemological status of its own claims. (25)
Self-reflection for Habermas, is an important aspect of philosophical knowledge.
It involves reflecting upon features of human existence and the nature of
human knowledge itself. Philosophical knowledge involves questions about values
and standards because it is concerned with the criteria of validity which are
appropriate to different types of science. In order to answer these questions,
one will have to make use of critical argument which is one of the uses of
language. In Rationalism Divided in TWo, Habermas states:
A critical discussion, regardless of whether it concerns the acceptance
of proposals or propositions, includes a threefold use of language:
the descriptive, in order to describe a state of affairs; the postulatory,
in order to establish rules of procedure; and the critical, in order
to justify such decisions. Logically these forms of speech mutually
presuppose each other. The descriptive usage is in no way limited
to a certain class of 'facts'. The postulatory usage covers the esta-
blishment of norms, standards, criteria and definitions of all kinds,
no matter whether practical, logical or methodological rules are
involved. The critical usage employs arguments for considering,
evaluating, judging and justifying the choice of standards; it includes
therefore language transcendent approaches and attitudes in its
discussion. (26)
Habermas outlines a "general theory of communicative competence" where he
specifies an "ideal speech situation". This "ideal speech situation" is
presupposed by the actual communicative competence displayed by all language
users. It involves norms which are related to the traditional ideals of truth,
freedom and justice. (27)
For Habermas, a critical theory of society must include interpretive understanding
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of the beliefs and modes of communication in a given society, a critical
evaluation of these, and an investigation of the determinants of those modes
of communication and belief. One has also to justify by self-reflection and
critical argument the departure of modes of communication and belief from
the norms. There has to be finally a specification of the kind of non-repressive
society in which these values can be realized.
Habermas maintains that a rational administration of the world (based on the
questionable thesis that man can control his destiny rationally to the degree
to which social techniques are applied), does not solve the practical problems
posed by history. History cannot be rationalized by "an extended power of
control on the part of manipulative human beings, but only by a higher stage
of reflection, a consciousness of acting human beings moving foward in the
direction of emancipation." (28)
One of the criticisms against Habermas' critical theory of society is that
a leaning towards positivism could be detected in the way he characterizes
the objects of the empirical-analytic sciences, and in his description of
their aim as the discovery of nomological knowledge.
He distinguishes forms of knowledge involved in interpretive understanding
and causal explanation. However, the danger is that critical social theory
will be split into two components which cannot be reconciled: an investigation
into causal relations which is not concerned with the subjective states of
human agents; and the interpretive understanding of human actions and beliefs.
2.5 Phenomenological Trends
The word •phenomenology· was used as early as 1765 in philosophical writings.
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However, Hegel was the first to attach a well-defined meaning to it. In his
Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel considers knowledge as it appears to consciousness.
Phenomenology, for Hegel, is the science describing the development which
natural phenomenal consciousness undergoes by way of science and philosophy
toward the absolute knowledge of the Absolute. (29) He aimed, therefore,
at phenomenal knowing through which we would arrive at true and authentic
knowledge of Absolute Mind.
Even though Hegel's influence is obvious in the philosophical writings of
contemporary phenomenologists, the word 'phenomenology' is no longer used
in the sense that Hegel used it. Many regard phenomenology in the sense as
meant by Edmund Husserl who is the so-called initiator of this school of
thought. Although Franz Brentano did not himself claim to be a phenomenologist,
his inclusion in the history of phenomenology is justified by deeper reasons
which are found in Husserl's repeated acknowledgements of his debt to Brentano.
Brentano considered it his task to bring about a fundamental reformation of
philosophy which, as a result of preoccupation with practical concerns,
scepticism and mysticism, had undergone a series of declines from its status
as a dignified conscientious attempt to achieve theoretical knowledge. Brentano
concluded that psychology pointed the way for the necessary reform of philosophy.
Brentano's attempts to find a characteristic which separates the psychological
from the non-psychological or 'physical' phenomena, culminated in the doctrine
of intentionality as the decisive constituent of psychological phenomena. It




Husserl viewed his work as a radicalization of Descartes' demand that all
philosophical knowledge be founded in absolutely certain insight. He aimed
to arrive at lIphilosophy as a rigorous science ll by means of his phenomenology.
Through a rigorously critical and systematic investigation, Husserl wanted
his phenomenological philosophy to attain the goal that philosophy had aspired
to from its very beginnings in Greece viz. to be an all-encompassing, intellec-
tually justified knowledge of all that is. Thus he wanted to find a method
which would lead to an absolutely valid knowledge of things. (30)
Husserl argues that although the natural sciences use refined methods and
apparatus, they are based on presuppositions which are not clarified in these
sciences themselves. Contrary to this, philosophy wants to reduce everything
to primary, immediately-evident lIpresuppositionsll, which do not need clarification
The non-philosophical sciences stem from the lI na tural attitude ll in which
man1s perception and thinking are turned towards things which are given as
unquestionably obvious. Judgements are based on perception. By induction
and deduction, we proceed from these judgements to new knowledge
lIrn this way natural knowledge makes progress. Constantly more
encompassing, it lays hold of hitherto obviously existing and given
reality whose extent and content, elements, relationships and laws
are to be more and more investigated. lI (31)
The natural sciences thus regard the world as a separate cosmic reality in
which we can consider any part we want without changing the objective nature
of what we consider. Husserl protests against the formalizing manner in which
the natural sciences approached the human world. He preferred to regard the
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world as a human 'lived-world' - hence his concept LEBENSWELT, e.g. he would
argue that Time is not necessarily divided into categories like hours, minutes
and seconds, but one minute can be experienced as infinite when one is expectant
or tense. The Lebenswelt is therefore an all-encompassing world within wllich
different objects can be discerned and recognized by means of the intentional
consciousness of man. (32)
Husserl believed that philosophy needed new starting points and an entirely
new method which was fundamental and presuppositionless :
(a) Original Intuition
The starting point of Husserl's phenomenology is a field of primordial phenomena.
Intuition implies that the subject and object are present to each other on
the same level. Husserl believes that his "reductions" can lead us to the
"lowest field of work." Reduction means that methodic procedure by which
one places oneself in the "transcendental spher~' - the sphere in which we
can perceive things as they are in themselves, independent of~ejudice. It is
a change of attitude through which we learn to see things we previously thought
to perceive, in an original and radical way.
(b) Eidetic Reduction
This is a methodic procedure through which we raise our knowledge from the
level of facts to the sphere of "ideas". By "essence" or "idea", Husserl,
means "pure generalities" which put before our mind pure possibilities whose
validity is independent of experience. (33)
36
(c) PhenomenoLogicaL Reductions
These reductions can be divided as follows:
1) The phenomenological reduction in the strict sense which is also
called the "bracketing of being".
2) The reduction of the cultural world to the world of our immediate
experience (Lebenswelt).
3) The transcendental reduction which is to lead us from the phenomenal
worldly "1" to transcendental subjectivity. This leads to the main
epistemological problem in Husserlian theory viz. the solipsist paradox
which will be explained below.
(d) IntentionaLity
The characteristic property of our consciousness is intentionality which directs
this consciousness to that which it itself is not. It is essentially an act
which gives meaning. All consciousness is consciousness of something. But
consciousness cannot be anything other than openness, directedness to the
other, and denial of self-foundation. Consciousness should therefore be
understood as a going-out-of-itself.
The paradox in Husserl~s philosophy consists of the following: The subject
who is constituting his world is simultaneously in the world and is thus part
of the world. The world thus loses its "an sich" quality and becomes an immanent
quality of the consciousness of the subject. The fallacy of this view is
proved when this remark is seen with reference to its consequence for regarding




Hei degger stressed the subject IS worl d (subject as "In-der-~~e It-sei n") as
the primary basis of knowledge. Subject and world are one and therefore
comprehension of "world" would involve comprehension by the subject of itself.
This comprehension is an intuitive condition for existence "Uberhaupt". He
saw the "knowing" act as a continuing "consciousness" or intuitive comprehension
of the subject's own existence. We can therefore distinguish between two
ways of acquiring knowledge: as Husserlian phenomenology or the Heideggerian
as a hermeneutic method. This line of development was followed by later
phenomenologists like Sartre, Merleau-Ponty etc. We shall examine the views
of Sartre.
2.5.3 Jean-Paul Sartre
Sartre's Position within the Phenomenological Movement
In Sartre1s earlier articles, he showed that he was clearly in agreement with
Husserl's phenomenological philosophy in general and in particular with Husserl's
view that Phenomenology entails important consequences for the sciences of man.
However, Sartre denied the existence of a transcendental ego in addition to
consciousness and that manifests itself in it. He held that there is no ego
in consciousness, but only an ego for consciousness. Consciousness itself
does not contain a transcendental ego. It is pure spontaneity, a mere activity
transcending itself toward mundane things. In defence of this view, Sartre
appeals primarily to our immediate experiences: in the unreflected experience
we do not find an ego; it manifests itself only in reflection upon direct
experiences.
Sartre also gives his attention to what he considers the most important
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characteristic of consciousness. He divides being into two fundamental kinds
(a) Being-in-itself is the self-contained being of a thing; the being of
a thing always co-incides with itself.
(b) Being-for-itself is co-extensive with the realm of consciousness.
Consciousness is oriented toward being other-than-itself; it does not
constitute, but it reveals being.
)
However, consciousness is always consciousness of something, of something
which itself is not consciousness - this implies the existence of the in-itself.
Consciousness must therefore either constitute that which itself is not cons-
ciousness, or it is facing a transcendent real thing. Thus a contradiction
in Sartre1s hypothesis becomes apparent. Sartre admits that consciousness
itself and that which is not consciousness must be real things in the world.
Sartre1s development of the idea that consciousness is supported by a being
which is not itself, was very much influenced by Heidegger1s view on man as
ek-sistence and Being-in-the-world.
Sartre derives two fundamental aspects of subjectivity viz. its negativity
and its freedom. Consciousness grasps itself by negating the in-itself of
its own being. Freedom then is the necessary correlate of the negativity
of consciousness as the complete negation of the in-itself. (35) Man is
not a thing - as nothingness in the realm of Being man is not yet determined.
Man is therefore free. He has to create himself in his situation in freedom
and complete responsibility.
Although Sartre initially does not criticize Husserl's view on reduction
(epoche) and constitution, there is in his writings on intentionality an
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implicit denial of the possibility of reduction. He believed that the Being
of objects is either discovered, or it can never be found by any act of cons-
ciousness. The world cannot be in co sciousness, as Husserl would have it,
but consciousness is in the world, as Heidegger had shown.
Herbert Spiegelberg has condensed the most important constants of Husserl's
phenomenology and hard-core existentialism which we will illustrate in the
followinq table. (36)
PHENOMENOLOGY EX ISTENTIALI S~1
1) A rigorous science; aims at 1) Does not aspire to be scientific.
absolute certainty for its foun- Systematic structures and abso-
dations and at freedom from lute certainty are not its
presuppositions. primary objectives.
2) Its subject-matter is the 2) Its subject-matter is human
general essences of the pheno- existence or "human reality"
mena of consciousness. and not consciousness.
3) It is based on the intuitive 3) Not restricted to any particular
exploration and faithful methods.
description of the phenomena
within the context of
Lebenswel t.
4) Uses special method of reduc- 4) Rejects phenomenological reduction
tions which suspends beliefs as practised by Husserl, and the
associated with our natural concern for transcendental sub-
attitude; traces back jectivity as the absolute founda-
phenomena to the constituting tion of all being.
acts in a pure subject.
5) Ultimate objective is the 5) Ultimate objective is not theo-
examination and justification retical justification but the
of all our beliefs by the test awakening of a special way of
of intuitive perception. life called "authentic existence"
Thus, although there are many connecting bonds between Husserl's theory and
Sartre's theory, there are still differences between them. The two points of
basic conflict centre about Sartre's rejection of the phenomenological reduction
and the transcendental ego. These, according to Sartre, draw us away from
the reality which intentionality gave.
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Sartre sees in the major principles of phenomenology implicit clues to
existential philosophy. In Sartre1s philosophy, Husserl 's original doctrine of
the intentionality of consciousness includes the existential dimension as
one of its possibilities. Sartre1s rejection of the transcendental ego ignores
its existential implications. Here, Sartre1s inadequacies illuminate Husserl's
achievements.
Sartre1s attempt at re-defining the authenticity of Man through existentialism
has to be appreciated for its contribution to philosophic thought. But he
has constructed a system of thought which is given universal validity. Any
such concrete attempt to envisage an a.bsolute order of meaning and value which
transcends our human context and resources is, in its very exercise, a self-
defeating project.
We see thus that both Heidegger and Sartre relinquished the Husserlian aim
of producing a transcendental philosophy as their interest in human experience,
in the "lived-in world", indicates a movement from essence to existence.
Brentano was concerned with the psychology of the self, whereas Heidegger
and Sartre were preoccupied with the self-in-the-world. This preoccupation
of Heidegger and Sartre does in a way take the Husserlian system back to
where it came from, viz. to the description of self-experience as outlined
by Brentano.
~fHusserl's leading disciples, it was only Schutz, whose ideas we will discuss
in detail in the following chapter, who consistently attempted to apply pheno-
menological ideas in his attempt to resolve pre-existing problems of sociology.
Schutz maintained a position in which phenomenology could provide the basis
for a fully-fledged science of social conduct, and in which intersubjectivity
does not appear as a philosophical problem, but as a sociological one.
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Schutz's ideas influenced sociologists who wished to use methods in their
empirical social research which were different from those prescribed by the
existing positivist methodological criteria. These perspectives were influ-
enced by German idealism, and by pragmatism which viewed human nature as
grounded in the potential creativity of each human being, and which could
be actualized and expressed only in interaction with other human beings in
the social order. "Truth" was considered to be a social construct that
emerges out of a continually changing socio-cultural environment. There was
a strong pragmatist influence on Schutz which can be traced in the works of
Charles Sanders Peirce and William James. However, he remained essentially
a social phenomenologist.
The influence of pragmatism is more clearly detected in the work by early
interactionists in which the concepts of consciousness, subjectivity and
intentionality remain crucial epistemological concepts. In our final chapter
we hope to shed more light on these issues.
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See, for example, the following publications
(a) Gouldner, A. (1970) : The Coming Crisis in Western Sociology,
Basic Books, New York.
(b) Friedrichs, R. (1970) A Sociology of Sociology,
Free Press, New York.
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CHAPTER THREE
TWO MAINSTREAM DEVELOPMENTS IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY IN THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES : A REACTION TO POSITIVIST DOMINATION
3. 1 Preamb1e
The goal of conventional research is that of discovering and verifying scien-
tific hypotheses. If, however, our aim is to reconstruct reality in order
to learn to see the world of an individual or group from the "inside" or from
the micro-level, we often have no way to do it scientifically, and neither
can we prove in a rigorous way that it has been done. However, to many social
scientists, it is essential that we gain access to the inside as they believe
that without such access, there is something vital that we will not know.
Numerous methodological strategies have evolved from efforts to reconstruct
the reality of the social scene, and most of them are cast within the theore-
tical framework of symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology based respec-
tively on pragmatism and social phenomenology as expounded in the previous
chapter. (1)
In this chapter we will examine the nature of insider's knowledge, which will
involve a detailed discussion of symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology, and
later chapter, why such knowledge is important for educational research metho-
dology.
3.2 Symbolic Interactionism
Symbolic interactionism rejects the structural explanation of human conduct
on the macro-level. Its adherents view it as a step away from the increasing
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quantification of sociology as a discipline, and as such, a step in the right
direction, and as the least biased mechanism for coming to grips with the
real world.
Individuals are seen to be interacting and modifying their conduct regardless
of position in the social structure, socio-cultural climates of vlaues and
norms, or institutional settings. Turner states that:
"Symbolic interactionists tend to conceptualize human interaction and
society in terms of the strategic adjustments and readjustments of players
in a game. While games have rules, symbolic interactionists are likely
to focus attention on how players interact in ways that, depending upon
the course of the interaction, create, maintain, and change the rules
of the game." (2)
Human beings attribute meanings to social objects and act toward these objects
in terms of these meanings. In the process of social interaction, these meanings
are constructed and reconstructed. The external world has coherence only with
specific regard to individuals who interpret externalities and impose meaning
on them. (3) Human actions are shaped by the actual or anticipated response of
others. Social reality is therefore unstable, since it is the result of ongoing
negotiations between mutually involved sets of actors who are always engaged
in interpreting, evaluating and defining processes. Only inductive procedures
will help us to understand human behaviour.
Thus, symbolic interactionists reject social theories that attempt to build
law-like propositions i.e. theories that proceed deductively. Human conduct
has perculiarities and an ever-changing character. Conceptual generalization
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and abstraction are abandoned. Concepts should perform a sensitizing function
and aided by sensitizing, one can carefully describe the social world. To
make sense out of data, the social researcher must take the role of others
and insert himself imaginatively in the flux of social interchanges between
actors. It is not possible for a social theorist to construct an objective,
ever-lasting theoretical structure. All he can do is to be attentive to the
subjective interpretations and emergent meanings that arise in human interaction.
Important amongst those who have contributed to the discourse field of symbolic
interactionism are George Herbert Mead, Anselm Strauss and Erving Goffman. We
will discuss the contributions of each.
3.2.1 George Herbert Mead (1863-1931)
Though the symbolic interactionist perspective is not exactly a unitary
approach,(4) those who identify with it regard G.H. Mead as the theoretically
central figure in the development of this school of thought. (5) Mead published
little, and our acquaintance with his works has come through the writings of
Herbert Blumer, one of Mead's chief disciples.
From those whom he called "The Romantic Philosophers," ~lead took a related
idea from the German idealistic tradition. (6) He felt that they had generalized
and made a philosophical doctrine of the notion of the life process.
He wrote that pre-Kantian philosophy "assumed that the world was there and
that human beings later came into it But, what the Romantic idealists
insisted upon is that you cannot have an object without a subject." (7)
Since there can be no consciousness which is not consciousness of something,
subject and object are inevitably intertwined.
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The German Kantian tradition insisted on the interplay between subject and
object in the process of knowing and in the construction of the self. Mead
states
"We can see that the self-process of the Romantic idealists - this
fusion of the two phases of experience, the self-experience on the
one hand and the subject-object experience on the other hand - was
one which enabled them to insist not only that the subject involved
an object but also that the object involved a subject." (8)
Thus, we see in Mead's work, that symbolic interaction is the interaction
that takes place among the various minds and meanings that characterize
human societies. Therefore, in a way, one can characterize Mead's work
as neo-Kantian. It refers to the fact that social interaction rests upon
a taking of oneself (self-objectification) and others (taking the role of
the other) into account. (9)
Mead's work on human behaviour is conceptualized within a "phylogenetic"
frame of reference, and his theories of individual and social behaviour rely
heavily UDon the principles of continuity and flux. He tended towards a
concept of man in dialectic relation with social reality.
In the sense of starting from the observable activity of the ongoing social
process, his social psychology is behaviouristic. However, Mead explains
that it is not behaviouristic in the sense of ignoring the inner experience
of the individual - the inner phase of that process or activity. On the
contrary, it is particularly concerned with the rise of such experience
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within the process as a whole. It simply works from the outside to the
inside instead of from the inside to the outside, so to speak, in its
endeavour to determine how such experience does arise within the process. (10)
Mead differentiates between humans and the remainder of the animal kingdom
whose communication is limited to the conversation of gestures. Man, however,
has the unique ability of using symbols. The difference between a gesture
and a symbol for Mead can be illustrated by the difference between punching
someone and shaking a fist at him. The former is a physical, observable
response, but the latter communicates the idea of anger in the shaker's mind
to the mind of another i.e. the person at whom the fist is being shaken,
interprets it as meaning hostility.
Mead regards language to be the most important category of significant
symbols, and argues that thinking can take place only by means of language.
Man's use of language is a manifestation of his ability to think about him-
self as an object, which makes him the only self-reflexive animal, and one
who is capable of purposive action. (11)
Mead's earlier articles are concerned with the educational problems facing
the school systems at that time, especially in Chicago, and he criticized
those v/ho saw the educational process as a separate category in the child's
life. Both he and Dewey stressed the need for a vocational system which
would bring the everyday world of society closer to the world of the
classroom. (12) In Mead's words the immediate task of the educational
system was
"To use the child's own impulse, his native interests, material which is
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worthy because it has meaning for hi~ and the nature for getting tech-
nique which springs from interest in what he does, and yet to make
felt the authoritative discipline and criticism of human achievement,
which is as real a part of the child1s normal life as it is of the
adult; though the incidence is not the same." (13)
It is clear in Mead l s articles on problems concerning the school systems
of the time, that ideally, the learning situation substitutes "the converse
of concrete individuals for the pale abstractions of thought." (14) The
relationship to the larger whole of society is crucial, for the child does
not develop a social nature through learning, but learning presupposes a
social nature.
These early articles indicate the evolvement of Mead's thoughts out of the
pragmatic tradition in respect of the ways in which he came to define humans
with respect to motivation. A consideration of some of the central matters
in Mead1s thoughts, viz. the self, the act, and social interaction, will
yield a more detailed analysis of these ideas.
(i) The Self
Mead saw the human being as an organism having a self which is comprised of
two component processes, the I and the ME. The possession of a self converts
the human being into a special kind of actor, transforms his relation to the
world, and gives his action a unique character. (15) It allows the human
being to be an object to himself and provides him with a mechanism of self-
interaction with which to meet the world. He can perceive himself, communicate
with himself, and act toward himself. This mechanism is used in forming and
guiding his conduct. Mead asserts :
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"The III or the ego is identical with the analytic or synthetic processes
of cognition, which in conflicting situations reconstructs out of the
'protoplasmic' states of consciousness both the empirical self (the
'me l ) and the world of object. The objective world is a mental construct
and is defined in terms of the needs of the III or the ego. It is
a man's reply to his own talk. Such a me is not then an early formation
which is then projected and ejected into the bodies of other people to
give them the breath of human life. It is rather an importation from
the field of social objects into an amorphous, unorganized field of what
we call inner experiences. Through the organization of this object,
the self, this material is itself organized and brought under the
control of the individual in the form of so-called self consciousness." (16)
It must be stressed again that Mead saw the self as a process and not as a
structure. If the self was lodged in a structure, it would not be able
to exercise any effect on itself or on its operation i.e. it would miss
the reflexive process which alone can constitute a self. Mead thus isolated
the reflexive process in the human being. It takes the form of a person
making indications to himself i.e. noting things and determining their sig-
nificance for his line of action. The process of self-interaction puts
the human being over and against his world instead of merely in it - it
requires him to handle his world through a defining process instead of merely
responding to it.
(ii) The Act
Action is built up in coping with the world. The human being makes indi-
cations to himself, interprets it, and then has to piece together a line
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of action. In order to act, he has to identify what he wants, map out a
line of behaviour, and note and interpret a line of behaviour. Although
the human act is self-directed, the actor may construct an unsuccessful act
by failing to note some things, by misinterpretation, poor judgement etcetera.
However, his acts are still constructed by him on the basis of what he
takes into account. He is not in the mere recipient position of responding
to matters; he stands "over and against" them and has to handle them. He
is therefore an active organism in his own right. Action is conduct con-
structed by the actor.
(iii) SociaL Interaction
Mead identified two forms or levels of interaction - non-symbolic interaction
and symbolic interaction. In the former, we respond directly to another's
gestures and actions; whereas in symbolic interaction, our action is based on the
the meaning yielded by our interpretation of each other's gestures.
The following are important aspects of symbolic interaction
(a) It is a formative process in its own right. The participants have to
continually interpret each other's ongoing lines of action and thus
build up their lines of action. They have to take account of each
other1s ongoing acts and have to re-organize and adjust their own
wishes, intentions, feelings and attitudes. They have also to judge
the fitness of norms, values and group prescriptions for the situation
being formed by the acts of others.
(b). Through symbolic interaction, human group life takes on the character
of an ongoing process - a continuing matter of fitting developing lines
of conduct to one another. This dual process of definition and
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interpretation not only sustains established patterns of joint
conduct, but also opens them to transformation.
(c) Central in symbolic interaction is the process of interpretation and
definition of one another1s acts. Symbolic interpretation therefore
covers relationships such as co-operation, conflict, consensus,
exploitation, domination, disagreement etcetera viz. the full range
of human relations.
We see thus, that for Mead, the individual is able to control purposively
and organize his conduct; that there is a dialectical relationship between
the "I" which gives the sense of freedom, initiative and self-conscious
action; and the "ME", that organization of the generalized attitudes held
by others and internalized by the individual. His theory of human behaviour
is more than a theory of self development in that his philosophy was to
provide a context within which the nature of self was bounded by time and
space, and where the role of the future, and the past, is seen as an important
variable in the motivational elements of behaviour which are dependent on
societal as well as individual variables. The individual therefore interprets
data presented to him in the social situation, and his choice of potential
solutions is bounded by the given facts of his membership in the wider society,
thus making him both determiner and determined. (17)
3.2.2 Anselm Strauss
Strauss asserts that most sociologists today are concerned primarily with
how they can obtain accurate facts and test theory rigorously :
The discovery of theory from data systematically obtained from social research
is called grounded theory. Strauss believes that as a result of the overemphasis
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in current social research on the verification of existing theory, the
generating of theory is often totally lost in specific researches. Barney
Glaser and Anselm Strauss regard theory in social research as a strategy
for handling data in research, providing modes of conceptualizing for
describing and explaining. Theory must also be readily understandable and
must therefore "fit" the situation being researched, and "work" when put
into use. (18)
In order for theory to fit and work, they advocate as the best approach an
initial, systematic discovery of the theory from the data of social research
as this will result in the discovery of categories which will be understood
by laymen who are involved in the area to which the theory applies; and
social researchers in other areas will recognise an understandable theory
linked with the data of a given area. (19)
Strauss believes that many highly empirical studies have at their conclusions
tacked-on explanations taken from logically-deduced theories. This, he
says, is due to the fact that authors of such studies have not been trained
to generate theories from the data they are reporting. They are able to
research and verify their facts, but unable to research and generate their
explanations of them. In contrast, grounded theory is so closely linked
to data that it usually cannot be replaced by another theory, or refuted
by more data. (20) It al so excludes use of theory for "exampl ing". (21)
Strauss maintains that the process by which a theory for sociology is generated,
is inextricably bound with its adequacy. The usefulness of a theory must be
judged by how it was generated, and the greater the degree that it has been
inductively developed from social research, the better a theory it is likely
to be. (22)
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Glaser and Strauss state :
"Generating a theory from data means that most hypotheses and concepts
not only come from the data, but are systematically worked out in relation
to the data during the course of the research. Generating a theory
involves a process of research." (23)
This means that the emerging theory actually guides and integrates the
processes of generating theory and of social research. (24) In contrast,
traditional methods of theory development rely on standard methods of social
research that are not directly formulated, controlled by, or related to
how the theory will be developed.
In addition to the three criteria already mentioned which grounded theory
meets viz. that a theory must have fit and relevance, and that it must work,
it meets also a fourth, that of being modifiable, based on ever-emerging
notions from more data. Strauss maintains that despite the fact that basic
social processes remain in general, their variation and relevance changes
in our world. As the ability of a theory to work the data reveals itself
in research, the theory has to be constantly modified. The recasting of
the theory is done almost as the new data appears, and this maintains the
tractability of grounded theory over social life, and hence its relevance. (25)
An important property of grounded theory is its transcending quality.
Because it is generative in nature, it takes the researcher beyond the
substantive area he is studying. Furthermore, as a general method of
analysis, it can combine and integrate several forms of data collection
such as case studies, experiments, surveys etcetera. Glaser states:
"The generative nature of grounded theory constantly opens up the mind
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of the analyst to a myriad of new possibilities for research, for
ideas, for other substantive areas of endeavour, for formal theories,
for projects and for variations in method." (26)
Grounded theory also reveals its transcending nature in that it conceptualizes
the data and raises thought about it to a higher level. By inclusion and
integration at a higher level ,it transcends previous theories and descriptions
about an area by making these theories and descriptions part of data which
are then compared to the emerging theory. The result is the generation
of an integrated, dense theory with a much greater scope.
An important part of the grounded theory method is how to write theory i.e.
writing of theory is part of the method itself. It is ideational in that
"it is a sophisticated, careful method of idea manufacturing." (27) When
grounding theory, emphasis is placed on thinking and generating ideas that
fit and work the data, thus making the grounded theorist merely a theorist
among theorists, but one who is theoretically sensitive to his data. (28)
Strauss feels that the clash between qualitative and quantitative methods
and data concerns the primacy of emphasis on verification or generation
of theory, but hOlds that both forms of data are useful for both verifi-
cation and generation of theory. Both forms are necessary and should be
used as "different forms of data on the same subject, which, when compared,
wi 11 each generate theory." (29)
However, Strauss feels that it is the qualitative method that finds best the
crucial elements of sociological theory, and that qualitative research is the
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most '~fficient way to obtain the type of information required and to
contend with the difficulties of an empirical situation." (30)
3.2.3 Ervrng Goffman
The differences among the several diverse schools of thought in contemporary
symbolic interactionism are on the basis of their conceptions of the central
ideas of symbolic interactionism~ and in preferred methodology. (31)
Goffman is the major exponent of the so-called dramaturgical approach
in symbolic interactionism. The ideas of Mead~ Durkheim and Simmel influ-
enced his views on the reality-constructing behaviour of humans~ and the
significance of ritual and ceremony in human social life.
Goffman maintains that when human beings interact~ they put on a "show"
for others in the sense that each tries to "manage" the impressions the
others receive of him or her. Goffman states :
"The perspective employed in this report is that of the theatrical
performance; the principles derived are dramaturgical ones. I shall
consider the way in which the individual ... presents himself and his
activity to others, the way in which he guides and controls the impres-
sions they form of him~ and the kinds of things he may and may not
do while sustaining his performance before them." (32)
To put it differently, in our interaction with others~ we put on 'performances,'
and act out our 'parts' making use of a 'setting l and 'props'. Goffman
assumes that an individual will have many motives for trying to control
the impressions that others will receive of the situation when he appears
59
before them, and that it is to his advantage to present himself in ways
that will best serve his ends. Goffman defines a situation as "an environ-
ment of mutual monitoring possibilities, anywhere within which an individual
will find himself accessible to the naked sense of all others who are
'present', and similarly find them accessible to him." (33) The self is
therefore an object about which the actor wishes to foster an impression.
Goffman recognises that the norms regulating social conduct are taken for
granted and thus tend to escape notice. With regard to the extent that
roles determine the behaviour of interactants, his approach reminds us that
roles, norms and positions are simply frameworks within which human inter-
action takes place. He states that:
"When an individual enters the presence of others, they commonly seek
to acquire information about hin or to brin~into play information
about him already possessed. Information about the individual helps
to define the situation, enabling others to know in advance what he
will expect of them and what they may expect of him." (34)
Acting on this information, the individual will tend to organize his
behaviour in terms of what he feels others expect is appropriate for someone
like him in that situation. He anticipates the responses that he wants,
and in order to achieve them, he considers the meaning his behaviour will
have for others, assesses his proposed behaviour in terms of the responses
it will evoke in them, and then acts (or changes his actions) in order to
achieve the responses he wants. The other actors in the situation do the
same. In other words, in most social situations, people take account of
each other and act according to their definitions of the situation.
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Goffman sees individuals frequently involved in a "performance" which he
defines as "all the activity of a given participant on a given occasion
which serves to influence in any way any of the other participants." (35)
In his view, when individuals come together they try to obtain information
about one another or to use whatever information about one another which
they already have. This information is derived from "sign - vehicles"
which are of two kinds: signs "given" through linguistic means and signs
"given-off" expressively.> Where the individual is concerned, interested,
or invests himself in the social situation, he generally has certain motives
for trying to control the impression that others receive of the situation.
Signs given and signs given-off together help to define the situation for
the interactors. Each of us depends on a number of "sign vehicles" in
making judgements about what we can expect of other people and what they
can expect from us.
Within interaction, conscious or unconscious interpretation of other people1s
actions and intentions is inevitable. Goffman argues that in social encounters
every person tends to act out a 'line ' which is "a pattern of verbal and
non-verbal acts by which he expresses his view of the situation, and by this,
his evaluation of the participants, especially himself. Regardless of whether a
person has consciously taken a line, he does so in effect, because the other
people assume he is doing so, that he is taking a stand. So if he is to
cope with their responses to him, he has to allow for the impression he has
made on them. And so on." (36)
We will now discuss briefly the dramaturgical analyst and his technique.
The dramaturgical analyst focuses on the creation of the character on the
part of the actor and the reception on the part of the audience. Success or
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lack of success (audience~ acceptance or rejection of the character) permits
the individual to direct his behaviour toward the most rewarding line of
activity and to avoid unrewarding behaviour which will lead in his being
"discredited". The consequences of activities thus depend upon others'
perceptions of the act and not the actor's consciousness or the way in which
he views the world. It is the actor's impressions which are of concern
to the others. The analyst thus focusses on these impressions.
The power of dramaturgical analysis lies in the discrepancy between the
perspective of the actor and that of the analyst. Theatrical similie is
utilized in order to analyze how actors and audiences manage to produce,
through their own activities, realities which they assume are a reality external
to themselves. These similies allow the analyst to stop taking for granted
what his subjects do and to begin relating what impressions the actor is
relating and in that very act of creation, what the actor is communicating
about himself.
Meaning simply "is", and thus becomes a matter of agreement. Thus the
dramaturgist avoids the seemingly endless philosophical debates about
meaning, the individual's perception of meaning etc. Instead, he relates
perceptions of meaning to behaviour. The absolute nature of meaning is left
to those disciplines whose province it is to deal with obscurities. Actors
understand the world in certain interactive terms; thus the analyst relates
actions to the interactional complex wherein they occur with all their
value-laden, culture-defined imperatives. Meaning relates more to the ongoing
quality of behaviour and depends in a sense on whether or not it will continue.
Meaning, interaction and guideposts of behaviour that all in the culture take
for granted, are in reality a process, and as such, are flexible and capable
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of change through interpretation, and an aspect of collective agreements
making up the understandable world. Thus interaction and meaning are viewed
as a function of consciousness and agreement.
Goffman has been criticized by many commentators for his view of man which
is that individuals are always concerned with presenting a convincing image
to others, and that they are always concerned with controlling the image
that others have of them. Since man always tries to present his best face
in order to win approval and recognition from others, the human being is
nothing more than an "impression-manager." Cuzzort refers to Goffman1s
views as "man as role-player and manipulator of props, costumes, gestures
and words," and "humanity as the big con." (37)
Blumer states that the weaknesses in Goffman's approach "stem from the narrowly
constructed area of human group life that he has staked out for study. He
has limited the area to face-to-face association with a corresponding exclusion
of the vast mass of human activity falling outside of such association.
Further, he has confined his study of face-to-face association to the interplay
of personal positioning to the cost of ignoring what the participants are
doing." (38)
It is our opinion that in fairness to Goffman, his image of humans in society
should be seen in view of the changing character of American society and
its embracement of a market-mentality in a society which is controlled by
large-scale bureaucratic organizations. (39) Having little influcence
over these organizations, and experiencing a diminished sense of power and
worth within these organizations to whom they are readily changeable units,
individuals try to manage the impressions that will increase or maintain their
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status; and are more concerned with presenting their best faces in an
attempt to win recognition and approval from one another. It is in this
sense that they become concerned with the appearance of things, more other-
directed.
Several writers have discussed the affinities between ethnomethodology and
symbolic interactionism. (40) We shall now examine ethnomethodology as
one of the mainstream developments in qualitative research methodology.
3.3 Ethnomethodology
It is relevant for our purposes that we remark on some ideas of the exponents
of the ethnomethodological school of thought. Prominent figures in this
school are Alfred Schutz and Cicourel.
3.3.1 Alfred Schutz (1899-1959)
Schutz was influenced both by Husserl and by Max Weber, an eminent sociologist
of that time.
The phenomenological tradition regarded knowledge as an act of consciousness and
attempted to ground it. For Husserl, the world is experienced and is made
meaningful in consciousness. As we have seen in Chapter 2, phenomenological
philosophy tries to describe the everyday experience of the 'life-world',
the world given in immediate experience. All consciousness is 'intentional'
in the sense that consciousness always has an object that constitutes it.
Husserl maintained that empiricism has failed to show how thought proceeds
from specific experiences to abstract classification, and therefore aimed
to establish a scheme that transcends empirical knowledge.
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In the epoche, we 'bracket ' all empirical particulars in order to penetrate
the essence of consciousness e.g. in our 'lived-in world' with our 'natural
attitude ' , we must clear away assumptions about ourselves, other people
and the physical world. Only then will subjectivity in its pure form be
revealed. After freeing ourselves from all bias and being able to look at
existence in its most essential aspects, we can re-emerge and reconstitute
the real historical world in all its complexity. (41)
Through Alfred Schutz, phenomenology had its main impact on sociology. His
earlier works depict a synthesis of Weber's approach to the methodology of
the social sciences and Husserl's phenomenology. (42) Schutz tried to
apply phenomenological ideas to resolve problems in sociology, and attempted
to make phenomenology provide the basis for a science of social conduct. He
focussed on intersubjectivity as a social, and not as a philosophical, problem.
By inverting Husserl's epoche, man with the 'natural attitude ' does not
suspend belief in material and social reality, but suspends doubt that it is
anything other than how it appears.
Schutz focussed on intersubjectivity, on how we understand each other, and
how our perceptions and conceptions of the world are similar. He discusses the
life-world (Lebenswelt) which is also referred to as the 'everyday world '
and as the "commonsense world". In this Lebenswelt are the physical and
social objects within which men live and pursue their routine activities.
ICommonsense man' who has a Inatural attitude' takes this world for granted
and does not question the meaningful structure of it. He does not try to
change or interpret this world, but merely lives in it and tries to make his
way in it. He experiences this world as one that is already organized;
it was here before he was born. As most knowledge is handed down to us, we
experience it as objective truth, as detached from us, as being the same for
everyone.
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We each have a unique biographical situation. A fundamental part of our
,knowledge is acquired from adults who bring us up. They in turn have their
own qualities and location in society which leaves an imprint upon us. Our
biographical situation has a 'stock of knowledge ' and since no two people
have the same biographical situation, our stocks of knowledge differ, and
we view the world with somewhat different perspectives.
We cannot know everything about everything as knowledge is socially distributed.
Knowledge is objective and external to the individual and this depends on it
being shared with others. In our Lebenswelt, we meet others and interact on
the basis of the reciprocity of perspectives. We assume that if we changed
places, we should perceive as the other does now. (43)
Schutz, in his study of the 'everyday world ' , complemented Weber's account
of 'meaningful action', and thus provided an adequate philosophical grounding
for Weber's sociology. Schutz concerned himself with two questions posed by
Weber's conception of social action viz. in action, how does the actor "attach
a meaning" to what he does; and in social action, how does the actor experience
others as persons separate from himself, but with their own subjective
experiences.
Schutz attempted to solve the problem of relativity by substituting it with
the notion of 'relevance' as actual focus of interest. Our life process
involves constantly shifting systems of relevance which depend on the over-
lapping and interweaving of the agent's hierarchy of projects. He states
that
"We are involved in the one actual and many marginal topical relevances
with layers of our personality on different levels of depth." (44)
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We can examine phenornenologically the understandinq of the conduct of others as
a process of typification. Schutz explains that:
"To a certain extent, sufficient for many practical purposes, I under-
stand their behaviour, if I understand their motives, goals, choices
and plans originating in their biographically determined circumstances.
Yet only in particular situations, and then only fragmentarily, can I
experience the others' motives, goals, etc. - briefly, the subjective
meanings they bestow upon their actions, in their uniqueness. I can,
however, experience them in their typicality." (45)
In order to organize reality, we have to classify and group. Typifications
display the structure of the life world and are socially learned and handed
down to us. We view unique qualities against a background of typification:
"The typifying medium par exceUence by which socially derived knowledge
is transmitted is the vocabulary and syntax of everyday language. The
vernacular of everyday life is primarily a language of named things
and events, and any name includes a typification and generalization
referring to the relevance system prevailing in the linguistic in-group
which found the named thing significant enough to provide a separate
term for it." (46)
Typifications can be seen as ideal-types and are an inherent feature of our
everyday knowledge. By this process of typification the actor applies learned
interpretative schemes to grasp the meanings of what others do. From the
"we-relationship", or the social relation of the directly-experienced other,
the actor derives all other notions of social forms that he applies in his
everyday social life. (47) An actor brings his stock of knowledge or
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"common-sense understandings" into any face-to-face encounter, and uses it
to calculate the probable response of the other to his actions, and to commu-
nicate with him. These stocks of knowledge are pragmatic in the sense
that they provide the actor with recipes for responding to others.
We accumulate experience as our biographies unfold, and through a process
of sedimentation, we assimilate new layers of knowledge into old typifications,
or form new ones. Our primary world is an intersubjective one of everyday
life, a natural attitude, and pragmatic interests. However, we also live in
other worlds or multiple realities of finite "provinces of meaning" e.g.
religious experience, childhood, dreams, art, science etc. The stocks of
Knowledge operate within these different provinces of meaning, and the
social actor has the competence to shift between these provinces of meaning,
but each transfer of attention or response is experienced by the actor as
a "shock". To put this differently, with 'epoche of the natural attitude, I
we suspend doubts that things may be other than what they seem. We doubt
within the 'finite provinces of meaning,' in which we suspend our commonsense
beliefs of the real world. We experience a 'multiple reality' as 'real'
when it has our attention. We progress from one province of meaning to
another by a Il eap • of consciousness. (48)
The sociologist works in a province of meaning viz. that of social science.
The reality inthis province of meaning bears a sharp contrast to the everyday
world where the individual IS stock of everyday knowledge serves practical
purposes and is inconsistent, incoherent and fragmentary. Scientific knowledge
is the opposite of this, and because it serves intellectual interests, it
has to satisfy the positive requirements in the scientific world viz. that of
consistency, clarity and coherence. The social scientist has to construct
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typifications of the typifications that his subjects make; he builds ideal-
types of ideal-types which Schutz calls "constructs of the second degree." (49)
The relevances of lay members of society are geared into the practical tasks
of day-to-day life. On the other hand, the relevance of the sociological
observer are cognitive and theoretical. Schutz is of the opinion that the
disinterested observer is : "concerned with problems and solutions valid
in their own right for everyone, at any place, and at any time, wherever
and whenever certain conditions, from the assumptions of which he starts,
prevails. The 'leap' into theoretical thought involves the resolution of
the individual to suspend his subjective point of view." (50)
The method of most interpretative approaches in the social sciences is to
establish theoretical constructs of 'typical modes' of conduct so as to
illuminate the subjective grounds of action. Schutz states that
"Every social science, including interpretative sociology, ... sets
as its primary goal the greatest possible clarification of what is
thought about the social world by those 1iving in it." (51)
For Schutz, the basic epistemological problem of social science is this -
can they be possible; as sciences of subjective meanings? They try to make
objective meaning claims, but these claims have been created within the
context of certain human activity, and cannot be understood apart from
them.
He argues that since one of the important aims of sociology is the recon-
struction of the ways in which agents explain their actions, the concepts
used by the sociologist must not be radically different from those of the
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agents. His models, which are 'constructs' created by him and which are
distinct from the actual ontological conditions of individual everyday
existence, and the concepts he uses, must obey a 'principle of adequacy'
in that they must relate the motions actors themselves use in building a
meaningful social world.
Schutz states that social-scientific concepts "must be constructed in such
a way that a human act performed within the real world by an individual
actor as indicated by the typical construct would be understandable to the
actor himself as well as to his fellow - man in terms of common-sense inter-
pretations of everyday 1ife." (52)
3.3.2 Aaron Cicourel
We have seen that one of Schutz's primary concerns was the relationship
between actors' concepts and those of the social scientist. In his view,
positivism's attempt to formulate a neutral language of observation not
only created significant tensions between actors' concepts and those of
social scientists, but was in fact an attempt to evade the socially grounded
nature of knowledge. Schutz believed that in order to achieve successful
understanding, the social scientist should aim to display the implicit meanings
that enter into the actors' worlds. His concern with how 'objectivity'
or 'truth' are established within a natural life world and its socially
organized setting, indicates that no one form of understanding is absolutely
superior to any other.
Schutz's work inspiredin part the growth of ethnomethodology which concerns
itself with the empirical examination of the processes through which meanings
are produced in social practice in order to elucidate human interaction.
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As such, rather than addressin9 meanings themselves, its concern is mainly
to describe the procedures of meaning production in any social activity. All
knowledge is seen to be communally grounded in human practice.
Ethnomethodologists are concerned with how individuals plan and explain
their own behaviour; how they determine what other persons are doing and
saying. It does not offer a method but a way of thinking about and inter-
preting the phenomena of everyday 1ife. It is interested in the procedures
which provide people an understanding of themselves and each other; the
principles which people utilize in the formulation of various practical
judgements; and the methods by which people construct theories that allow
them to engage in ordinary everyday activities.
Ethnomethodology emphasizes the variability of meanings in every social
situation. Humans have the ability to generate 'new' sentences and meanings
and can, therefore, not be generalized from one situation to another. The
key term used is 'indexicality'. Conversations convey more than actually is,
or can be said. They contain terms that are not explicitly defined in the
particular situation. Participants draw on their stock of knowledge, including
linguistic knowledge, and on their exploration of the situation at hand,
in order to achieve working definitions of such 'indexical experessions. ' (53)
Cicourel wrote :
"My basic assumption is that the clarification of sociological language is
important because linguistic structure and use affects the way people inter-
pret and describe their world. Since sociologists have evolved their own
theoretical terminologies and frequently discuss, on the one hand, in these
varying terms the language and substance of each others' theories and on the
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other hand, the language of persons in everyday life whose behaviour they
are interested in explaining and predicting, it is quite likely that the
syntax and meaning of these languages will become entangled." (54)
Cicourel used this argument to develop:::a--critique of sociological
research. When one engages in social research, there will always exist what
are, from the researcher's point of view, non-relevant factors which
influence the respondent's report. Cicourel emphasized that data-collection
activities involve the same relevancies and the same social processes found
in other social situations. In, for example, the survey interview situation,
interviews and respondents employ the same mechanisms that they employ in
many other social situations :
"Canons of research demand that the interviewer operate somewhat
like a computer with all the appearances of a fellow human being,
but, so far as we know, persons in everyday life find it impossible
either to present themselves as both or to receive presentations
of others (regardless of the form it takes) which conform to the
stri ct canons of sci entifi c i nqu i ry. 11 (55)
Cicourel thus points out that just as interviewers and respondents cannot
avoid mechanisms which produce biases in everyday social activities, they
cannot avoid mechanisms which produce biases in data-collection activities.
When extrapolating from the interview to the real world, it must be
remembered that the interview is itself a part of that real and social world.
Whatever methods are used, "researchers in the social sciences are faced
with a unique methodological problem: the very conditions of their research
constitute an important complex variable for what passes as the findings of
their investigations." (56)
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Cicourel contended that it is not necessary to sort out the 'confusion'
of first- and second-degree constructs with which sociologists work. Since
sociology draws heavily on 'everyday' explanations, sociology itself is just
another life-world created by its members, and is therefore equally valid
to any other socially constructed reality.
Conventional sociology has also been accused by ethnomethodologists of
abstracting the concept of 'role ' and treating roles as if they were things
which make up a static social structure. Subjects are portrayed by social
scientists as 'judgemental dopes' or 'cultural dopes' whom Garfinkel defines
as men who produce "the stable features of the society by acting in compliance
with pre-established and legitimate alternatives of action that the common
culture provi des." (57)
Since knowledge of social behaviour is obtained by means of symbols or lang-
uage, it is imperative that one uses the same language as in the intended
field of research in order to give a true account of reality. Cicourel states
"If it is correct to assume that persons in everyday life order their
environment, assign meanings or relevances to subjects, base their
social actions on their common-sense rationalities, then one cannot
engage in field research or use any other method of research in the
social sciences without taking the principle of subjective interpretation
into consideration." (58)
./
We would like to comment on two significant departures of ethnomethodology
from the general interactionist tradition. One of these is indicated by
Dreitzel when he notes that the ethnomethodologists, unlike most interactionists,
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maintain that "the social order, including all its symbols and meanings,
exist not only precariously but has no existence at all independent of the
members' accounting and describing practices". (59) The focus of ethno-
methodology is "not on activity but rather on the process by which members
manage to produce and sustain a sense of social structure." (60)
Secondly, in the work of Cicourel we find indications of the ways in which
sociologists construct with each other a flimsy social reality which often
leads to the assumption by sociologists of certain givens. This assumption
thwarts efforts to understand social conduct from the perspective of the
actor.
Our discussion of the symbolic interactionist and ethnomethodological frame-
works shows that both direct attention to the social deprivation of man's
unique attributes; and represent mind and self as society in microcosm. In
numerous ways they implicate the individual with society and society with
the individual. Hence, both paradigms rely heavily on sympathetic intro-
spection and on participant observation as techniques for social research,
and implement everyday language in their interpretation of everyday reality.
Subtle epistemological differences do exist between these frameworks, but
we will not analyse them in great depth. However, it is necessary to remark
on these because the confusion between symbolic interactionist approaches
and ethnomethodological approaches can possibly be attributed to an ignorance
of these differences.
In the analysis of the relationships between "man and the world" and "subject
and object", symbolic interactionism takes the "Act" as its premise before
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embarking on its analysis of symbols which are seen to generate meaning.
Ethnomethodology takes "Intentionality" as its premise in its analysis of
the processes by which people constitute meaning in the social world. The
concept 'meaning' is evident in both frameworks, but again meaning operates
in different ways in their analysis of the relationship.
The concept 'reciprocity' is a common factor in symbolic interactionism and
ethnomethodology, but the 'constitution of the world' seems to be the actual
difference between the two conceptions of man and reality.
In phenomenology, constitution implies meaning once intentionality constitutes
meaning. We do not think that Mead will have any quarrel with such a statement
except that meaning seems to be more of a second-order concept. In other
words, in Mead's theory, it does appear as if meaning is not seen as an
immediately given characteristic of the mentioned relationship. Mead uses
the term "gesture" as a starting point, but it is only when the gesture
becomes a significant symbol, that meaning enters.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE HISTORY AND PRESENT POSITION IN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.
4.1 Introduction
Educational research occupies an important position in the social sciences
today and has been accompanied by a parallel growth in the use of research
for educational policy-making. The trends and theories can be grouped under
the following headings:
A. Functionalist theories of Education.
B. Marxist Perspectives of Education.
C. The Interpretive approach to Education.
Amongst the classical sociologists of the nineteenth - and twentieth centuries
who made important contributions to education, Emile Durkheim (1858-1917)
features prominently. His views have been taken up and developed by the
Imodern Durkheimians. ' (1) Before the 1950 1 s, not much was achieved in
the sociology of education in terms of assessing educational research.
However in the 1950's there was a influx of social scientists into the field
of educational research. Headed by sociologists, they were determined to
apply the social scientific method of scientific precision and detachment
in their treatment of educational institutions. (2) During this time Talcott
Parsons was the dominant figure in functionalist sociology, and work in
education tended to be of two types :
(a) The tradition of ·political arithmetic· was concerned with the problem
of social class and educational attainment;
(b) The functional theory was used to relate education to the economy,
social mobility and the political order. It was applied to the study
of school organization and, through role-theory, to teacher-pupil
interaction.
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As a result of the major empirical and logical difficulties encountered
by functionalism, new alternative approaches developed. There were in
Britain sociologists who were working in other traditions and whose
choice of problems were influenced by socialism. These sociologists were
critical of functionalism e.g. F10ud and Ha1sey said:
"The structural functionalist is preoccupied with social integration
based on shared values - that is with consensus - and he conducts
his analysis solely in terms of the ootivated actions of individuals.
For him, therefore, education is a means motivating individuals to
behave in ways appropriate to maintain the society in a state of
equilibrium. But this is a difficult notion to apply to developed
especially industra1ized societies, even if the notion is interpreted
dynamically. They are dominated by social change, and 'consensus'
and 'integration' can only be very loosely conceived with regard to
them." (3)
Another development in the 1960s in mainstream social sciences was the
resurgence of various forms of Marxism, phenomenology and interactionist
theory in Europe and America. In social action theory and phenomenology
example, Berger and Luckmann, and Dawe and Cicoure1 had the major impact
on the sociology of education. Broadly speaking, two forms of the inter-
pretive approach developed:
(a) One trend drew on interactionism and ethnomethodo1ogy and phenomenology, for
in order to study the 'micro' social processes in the classroom and
school. This trend began ana1yzing in detail classroom interaction,
teachers' and pupils' "definitions of the situation", and the role
of language.
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(b) From the second trend emerged the 'new' sociology of education which
concerned itself with knowledge as a social construct. (4)
Controversy between Marxists and functionalists, and between the "old" and
the "new" sociology of education created a crisis in educational research.
In this chapter we will try to place some of the debates in their social
and historical context. We will also focus on a few important problems
in educational research with the intention of showing that an awareness
of the social settings from which these problems emerge can contribute to
a deeper understanding of them. More attention will be given to the inter-
pretive approach to education.
4.2 The Functionalist Tradition
Emile Durkheim, the 'founding father' of sociology, made a thorough study
of education and based on his theory of man and society, concluded that
education is essential if society is to remain orderly. (5) In his
thinking about education and his study of society, he applied the methods
of natural science. One of his major aims was to discover how in the complex
modern world, an orderly society was maintained.
In The Rules of Sociological Method, Durkheim argues that even though society
is made up of individuals, it is different and distinct from its component
parts. (6) Language, legal, and moral systems rather than individuals
should be studied. He sees society as a reality in its own right, with
an existence that is independent of, and external to, individuals. (7)
Society has its own 'l aws ' of evolution; it changes people but is not
changed by them, and thus, society is in a way analogous to 'nature l • It
becomes the business of the social scientist to study and understand the
laws of society.
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Since society is real, moral systems and values, social institutions, cus-
toms etcetera-the social facts - must be treated like things in nature.
When we are examining the phenomenon education, we must first define it
and then seek an explanation of it that is both 'causal' and 'functional.'
He insists that the causal explanation must be in terms of 'impersonal'
social forces and not in terms of the purposes, intentions and actions of
individuals or of identifiable groups of individuals. (8)
The implication of this view is that education should be examined in terms
of its relation to the political system, the class system, the economy and
its usefulness to society rather than the individual. Since education
is essential, ~ccording to Durkheim, for society to remain orderly, the
sociologist has to consider the part it plays in maintaining social order
and social stability.
4.2.1 Approach to Education
By the 1950s it was structural functionalism, as formulated by Talcott Parsons,
that sociologists of education used as their theoretical framework and con-
ceptual guide. Parsons stressed "the sharing of common values" as is made
very evident in the following passage
"Probably the most fundamental condition underlying this process (of education)
is the sharing of common values by the two adult agencies involved - the
family and the school, in this case the core of the shared value of achievement.
It includes, above all, recognition that it is fair to give differential
rewards for different levels of achievement, so long as there has been
fair access to opportunity, and fair that these rewards lead to higher-order
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opportunities, for the successful. There is thus a basic sense in which
the elementary school class is an embodiment of the fundamental American
value of equality of opportunity, in that it places value both on initial
equality and on differential achievement." (9)
Parsons claims that the extension of equality of opportunity by education
has caused differences in educational attainment which have introduced new
forms of inequality. (10) As these inequalities are a potential source
of conflict and division in society, the major function of education is
"to legitimate these inequalities through the process of 'socialization'
by making them acceptable i.e. to inculcate the view in members of society
that it is proper for those who do well in education to be rewarded, that
they have earned higher income, status and position in the system of
social stratification. The ideology of 'equal opportunity' and 'achievement',
a major element of the 'common culture' which holds society together and
creates order and maintains stability, has to be spread by education. (11)
Parsons states that the school's function is "the socialization of indivi-
duals and ... their allocations to roles within society.I' (12) Education
must contribute to the maintenance of a value consensus in society. The
shared values, norms, and beliefs will manifest themselves in the social
system which will then shape the personalities of individuals in accordance
with the demands of their culture and of their social roles. Through socio-
lization the values of society will be inculcated into individuals - they
will play their roles properly, and hence social order and stability will
be maintained. The individual internalizes society's values, and what society
expects of him (role - expectation) has to be fulfilled because he feels
a 'need' to do so.
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TABLE 4.1
Culture - shared values
l
Social Structure - roles/role expectations
~
Individuals - needs - - - - - - - --.. --
Maintain shared values
i
Individuals act out their rol
SOURCE D. Blackledge and B. Hunt, Sociological Interpretations of Education,
(Croom Helm Ltd, Beckenham Kent, 1985), p. 73.
Education plays a major role in this process and in addition, equips people
with technical and social skills. Parsons asserts that all pupils begin
from a basis of equality, but there is much evidence to the contrary which
suggests that in the preparation of children for education, there is a great
deal of difference. (13) However, research conducted by R. Rist in his
three-year study of a school in St. Louis, U.S.A., destroys Parsons' thesis
that school is organized on the basis of equality. Rist shows that teachers
assumptions and preconceptions often influence their assessment of pupils'
abilities. (14)
In the 1950s the II co ld war ll between the United States and the Soviet Union
and the development of nuclear weapons provided evidence that technological
superiority led to military dominance. Systems of education had to produce
scientists and engineers, and this led to a concern for the preservation
of IIhuman resources ll • The brand of functionalist theory - technological
functionalism - used in educational research at this time, saw the expansion
and increasing differentiation of the educational system as inevitable outcomes
of technologically determined changes in occupational structure. (15) The
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methodology used in Britain in the sociology of education can be termed
political arithmetic. The institutionalization of the sociology of education
was facilitated by borrowing theories and procedures.
4.2.2 Assessment of the Functionalist approach to education
We will examine briefly some of the main ideas of functionalism on consensus,
change and approval-seeking.
(i) Consensus
It would be difficult to find in, for example, Britain, values which are
common to all members of society. British society can be seen as a series
of social groups each with its own value systems with no values common to
all groups. Thus education cannot, as Parsons says it does, transmit such
values. Education may transmit the values of the dominant group. One
has also to consider that educational theories derive from general social
and political ideologies and thus as these rise or decline in importance,
changes in the structure of the educational system and educational provision
are bound to occur.
(ii) Change
Because of the undue emphasis on equilibrium, functionalism is unable to
deal with the issue of social change. Society is seen to be a stable entity
where everyone has a clear idea of his role in the various social institu-
tions. Some critics feel that the functionalist theory of social stability
contains inadequacies. (16)
(i i i) Approval Seeking
The structural notion of roles is tied up with the view that we play our roles
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in order to gain the approval and esteem of others. However, Peter Woods
in his chapter on 'Pupil Adaptations' in the book The Divided School, and
Viv Furlong point out that though the teachers' approval is an important
motivating factor in pupils' behaviour, there are several other motives
which indicate that approval-seeking is not the primary motive in many
instances for pupils' conduct. (17) It is also often the case that when
we do what one set of people expect of us, we disappoint and risk the dis-
approval of another set of people. The functionalists, because of their
assumption of a consensus of role-expectations in society, do not even
consider such possibilities. In the words of Dennis Wrong, functionalism
presents 'an extremely one-sided view of human nature.' He continues his
argument by stating "Modern sociology, after all, originated as a protest
against the partial views of man contained in such doctrines as utilitarianism,
classical economics, social Darwinism, and vulgar Marxism. All of the great
nineteenth - and twentieth century sociologists saw it as one of their major
tasks to expose the unreality of such abstractions as economic man, the gain-
seeker of the classical economists; political man, the power-seeker of the
Machiavellian tradition of political science; self-preserving man, the security-
seeker of Hobbes and Darwin; sexual or libidinal man, the pleasure-seeker
of doctrinaire Freudianism; and even religious man, the God-seeker of the
theologians. It would be ironical if it should turn out that they have merely
contributed to the creation of yet another reified abstraction in socialized
man, the status-seeker of our contemporary sociologists." (18)
4.2.3 Summary
It has been pointed out by Weber that functionalist theory gives no causal
explanation, but it can provide us with a framework in that it can suggest
certain functions and specify certain relations between education and
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other parts of society. (19) However, functionalism as the dominant theory
in educational research was rejected, and a number of new approaches developed
along different theoretical lines. It was necessary to observe the inter-
action of people and discover how they thought and felt since it was people
in interaction who made society. In education this meant observing face-
to-face interactions or involvement in interactions in studying teachers'
and pupils' definitions of learning, intelligence, the good and the bad pupil
etcetera.
4.3 The Marxist Perspective
In Chapter two, we concentrated on Habermas because he is the most explicit
contemporary neo-Marxist. However, we will attempt to illustrate that in
educational research, neo-Marxist views are more often interwoven with other
Marxist branches of thought.
Some of the ideas of functionalism were adopted by the Marxists and then
adapted to the Marxist conception of society. Like structural functionalism,
the Marxist approach tries to explain how education contributes to the
status quo.
The main ideas and issues within Marxist theory can be seen as t~o parts,
the first of which is our major concern:
(a) The theory of society and history (historical materialism) which concerns
itself with how society changes and how the various parts are related
to one another; and




Production is fundamental because everything in society is related to it,
or derives from it. The two major parts of society are the economic structure
or 'foundation', and the 'superstructure' of other social institutions and
practices such as education, politics, men's ideas, beliefs and values etc.
Marxists believe that the superstructure is related to economic activity
but they differ in their views about the nature of this relationship. (20)
On examining the writings of Marx and Engels which provide evidence for
an economic determinist interpretation of historical materialism, one finds
that it is denied by historical materialism that individuals can control
their destiny. (21) They are controlled by certain objective, impersonal
forces or processes, and are not the creators of these processes. Thus
the world of nature points the way in which society can be studied. Natural
scientists try to discover the 'causes' of events and 'laws' of nature.
Social scientists can therefore formulate certain 'laws' of society and
social change which will not only explain to us what is happening in the
world, but will also tell us what is going to happen. Newton and Darwin
had provided us with the laws of nature and of biological evolution; Marx
believed that he had discovered the laws of social evolution.
Structural Marxists, of whom Louis Althusser is the most notable exponent,
combine a determinist view of the social process with an 'interaction' view
of the relationship between the base and the superstructure.
Voluntarist Marxists e.g. the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, do not see
Marxism as a 'science of society' which uses natural science as its model.
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They hold that economic changes do not provide sufficient conditions for
change to a superior society. Technological changes are important but do
not in themselves lead to major sociological changes. These sociological
changes occur when there are also certain 'subjective' conditions. In
order to achieve a superior social and political system, men have to
consciously intervene at appropriate moments of history and make use
of the opportunity which economic progress offers us.
4.3.2 The Marxist Analysis of Education
The theories of 'direct reproduction' hold that education 'reproduces' or
helps maintain the capitalist economic system. In this section, we will
consider some of the works which have attracted most attention within
the sociology of education.
(i) s. BowZes and H. Gintis (22)
These authors maintain that education can only be properly understood in
the context of society of which it is a part. It is argued that education
in the United States tries to reproduce the capitalist system and thus
maintains and reinforces existing social order:
"education and state policy are relatively powerless to rectify social
problems within the framework of a capitalist economy." (23) Thus education
cannot act as a force for social change. (24) These authors are of the
opinion that "the educational system is an integral element in the repro-
duction of the prevailing class structure of society." (25) Like Parson's
analysis where he sees the functions of education to be socialization and
selection, Bowles and Gintis feel that education legitimates the class
structure and prepares young people for work in a capitalist economy. Unlike
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Parsons, they disapprove of the social system into which children are
being socialized and selected. The education system transmits the 'technocratic-
meritocratic' ideology or the 'ideology of equal educational opportunity
and meritocracy.' They take ability as synonymous with 1.Q. but do not
feel that this is an important criterion for success. Rather, it is a
person's socio-economic background which is important for success.
With regard to socialization, the second method of reproduction, they say
of school that it "tailors the self-concepts, aspirations, and social class
identifications of individuals to the requirements of the social division
of labour." (26) By crushing creativity and spontaneity, and rewarding
Passivity and obedience, schools destroy the capacity for self-determination
and teach people to be 'properly subordinate'. Thus they are rendered
incapable of controlling their economic and social activities. All this
is attained through the 'correspondence principle', (27) which is explained
in the following way:
"the educational system operates in this manner not so much through the
conscious intentions of teachers and administrators in their day-to-day
activities, but through a close correspondence between the social rela-
tionships which govern personal interaction in the work place and the social
relationships of the educational system. Specifically, the relationships
of authority and control between administrators and teachers, teachers and
students, and students and their work replicate the hierarchical division
of labour which dominates the work place." (28)
The process of socialization therefore takes place through the hidden
curriculum, the 'form' of the education system rather than through the 'content'
of the education system. Bowles and Gintis draw upon some pieces of research
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which show that education consistently rewards the same types of behaviour
and personality traits viz. perseverence, dependability, punctuality, and
identification with the organization.
Bowles and Gintis argue that their study has established la strong prima facie
case for the causal importance of economic structure as a major determinant
of educational structure.' (29) Their case can be represented as follows
1) What education does reproduction.
2) How education reproduces ------- the correspondence principle.
3) Forces responsible for reproduction ------- economic structure.
They try to demonstrate statistically, by means of a 'path diagram l , their
belief that it is erroneous that economic rewards are based on ability, but
that they are in fact determined by social class background :
TABLE 4.2













SOURCE S. Bowles and H. Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America, RKP,
London, 1976, p. 133.
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Using survey data, they calculated the strength of various influences. They
found that I.Q. is less influential than background in determining adult income.
However, Coxhead found that there is no path between background and adult I.Q. (30
Coxhead's calculations indicate that Bowles and Gintis did not prove their
case, but their thesis itself, viz. that education, by being presented as a
ladder for able people, legitimates the class system - has not been disproved. (3
(ii) Louis AZthusser
Althusser's analysis of education is similar to that of Bowles and Gintis. (32)
Education and all components of the superstructure are said to be elements
of the 'State Apparatus'. The institution of education is regarded as an
Ideological State Apparatus (ISA), which together with other ISA's such
as the religious, the political, communications, the cultural etc., maintain
the capitalist system of exploitation in the following manner
(a) Teaches the skills and techniques appropriate to the child's future
job.
(b) Imparts the 'rules of good behaviour' or attitudes which are suitable
for the child's later economic role.
(c) Teaches children the ruling ideology of capitalist society both directly
and indirectly. He states that education "drums into them, whether
it uses new or old methods, a certain amount of 'know-how' wrapped in
the ruling ideology (French, arithmetic, natural history, the sciences,
literature) or simply the ruling ideology in its pure state (ethics,
civic instruction, philosophy)." (33)
Althusser believes that the 'universally reigning ideology of the school'
obscures this role of the educational system. Teachers are seen to be at
the mercy of the system, forced to perform these functions. It has been
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pointed out that Althusser's analysis is similar to that of Durkheim's and
Parsons in his concern with explaining the social order. (34) He sees no
need to investigate the perceptions of teachers and pupils. It is assumed
that the process of socialization is successful, and that men can do nothing
about the pressure exerted by the state.
(iii) Resistance, Relative Autonomy and Voluntarism
In recent years in Marxist sociological theories of education, 'resistance'
within education to the process of the reproduction of capitalism has been
stressed. These studies show the relative autonomy of education and are
much more voluntaristic in nature. (35) These studies consider 'resistance '
to the demands of the capitalist economic structure as a fundamental feature
of the educational system. They argue that there exists oppositional cultures
within the education system. Therefore, schools cannot simply mould their
pupils to fit the 'needs' of contemporary society. Opposition is a manifes-
tation of the attitudes and values found in working-class culture. Human
will and agency and structure are important. It is not the operation of
impersonal economic forces which make human beings act the way they do. Pupils
creatively adapt to the environment. Reproduction does take place but in an
'indirect' way, alongside or through the process of resistance.
4.3.3 Summary
We see thus that the Marxists have produced a number of variations on a
common theme.
Bowles and Gintis maintain that through a correspondence between the social
relations of production and the social relations of education, education
prepares pupils to be workers, but empirical evidence does not support a theory
of correspondence between the organization of education and the demands of the
capitalism economy. (36)
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Erben and Gleeson point out that Althusser's view resembles the functionalist
view of Durkheim and Parsons who are also concerned with explaining the
existence of social order. There is an implicit assumption that the process
of socialisation is successful.
The Marxists in their concern for explaining the existence of social order,
concentrate on reproduction to show how social order is maintained. Education
is seen to help maintain the status quo. An examination of the Marxist
analyses of education reveals that despite differences, there are clear
similarities with functionalists - both assume that education is successful
in its socialisation and legitimating functions.
4.4 Interpretive Approaches to Education
The "micro" sociological approaches developed as a reaction to the lack
of relevance and unacceptable assumptions of the 'macro' approaches. They
share several assumptions which we will discuss briefly
If we want to understand education, we must begin by looking at everyday
activity since every aspect of society is built upon how people act in
everyday life. It is the day-to-day activities of teachers, pupils, inspectors,
administrators etc. that keeps education going, and it is changes in these
activities that bring about changes in education and society. (37)
Even though constraints and our background influence the way we act, there
is always some degree of autonomy and freedom present in our everyday activity.
Put differently, we can and do create our own activity to some extent. (38)
97
The term 'meaning' in interpretive theory includes such notions as aims,
intentions, significance and reasons. Actors construct meanings from culture
and society i.e. the meanings are personal to the actor. In order to under-
stand everyday activity, we therefore must grasp the meanings that people
give to their behaviour.
Since most of our everyday activity involves interaction with other people,
we have to give meaning or interpret the behaviour of the people with whom
we interact. To illustrate this, let us consider an example: The teacher
asks a question and pupils put up their hands. The teacher has to interpret
the pupil's action. Does he know the answer? Is he afraid of being detected?
Does the pupil not want to appear stupid? The teacher's interpretation will
affect his subsequent action e.g. if he thinks the pupil is trying to avoid
detection, he will probably ask him for the answer. What is significant
is that what the teacher 'already knows' about the pupil, e.g. age, sex,
race, intelligence, motivation etc., will affect the teacher. If the teacher
'knows' that the pupil is lazy and poorly motivated, this will affect his
interpretation of his action. Put differently, we have 'typifications' of
people which we use to interpret their behaviour.
Among other elements which will affect our interpretation of action are
our 'categories' of activities. We may, for example, have a set of assump-
tions according to which we categorize what constitutes 'messing about' or
'working'. We do not examine these assumptions because we regard them as
common sense and they are therefore taken-for-granted. However, it is
essential to our understanding of how a person comes to act in the way that
he does, to investigate the common-sense assumptions which are being used.
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The actors' meanings and interpretations are not constant and unchanging.
We often modify our views. Over a period of time, and through the continuous
process of 'negotiation' of meaning, actors come to have shared understandings
and meanings.
The interpretive approach demands that we adopt the 'subjectivist' method
in order to understand how an actor defines the situation. The danger is
that when we are observing behaviour our interpretation of it may be affected
by our own preconceived ideas if we enter the field with these in mind.
Similarly, we are liable to misinterpret behaviour if we have notions of
'ability', 'work', 'messing about' etc. The interpretive approach argues
that we must 'bracket out' our own assumptions and typifications in order
to elicit the actors' views and to be true to the meanings and understandings
of those whom we are observing.
A difficult problem to deal with methodologically is that of observer bias.
One cannot avoid entering a situation with certain preconceptions and assump-
tions. Theory should function to sensitize us to aspects of the actors'
subjective make-up. The researcher's job is to give meaning to the actors'
meanings by locating them within the wider context of society. The observer
cannot merely describe activity - he has to structure the data he presents.
4.4.1 Variations within micro approaches
We will focus on studies in the British context since the micro approach in
sociology has generated an extensive literature in Britain and represents an
extensive critique of traditional research and an attempt to provide a new
paradigm for understanding schooling.
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Despite the fact that the various micro approaches share several of the
assumptions discussed above, variations do exist among them.
(i) The Interactionist Perspective
Teachers and pupils want to achieve different goals. The relationship
between them is therefore seen to be a situation of conflict. Each
party tries to impose its definition of the situation on the other.
Since the teacher's domination is never total, negotiation has to take
place.
(ii) The Phenomenologist Perspective
The actor's knowledge of other people involved in the situation is
important, and phenomenologists therefore try to elicit this knowledge.
Actors use a set of categories by which they interpret the behaviour
of others and come to 'know' them. (39) Phenomenologists argue that
it is important to examine the taken-for-granted language and its
implicit meanings in order to grasp the actors' definitions of the
situation.
(iii) The Ethnomethodologist Perspective
The focus of interest is the procedures and processes which - actors
use in order to make the world intelligible.
We note the~ that there are differences in emphasis within these approaches.
Since interaction and phenomenology share much common ground, we will not
distinguish between the two in our exposition. The ethnomethodological
position will be dealt with separately.
4.4.1.1 Symbolic Interactionism in Educational Research
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In this section we will examine the ideas of David Hargreaves, particularly
those expounded in his book Interpersonal Relations and Education, Martyn
Hammersley and Peter Woods.
(i) David Hargreaves
Hargreaves draws on the idea of G.H. Mead, which we have dealt with in
detail in Chapter 3, especially those dealing with 'the self'. He discusses
its development and traces implications for the analysis of the relationship
of the teacher and pupil.
Hargreaves' exposition of the symbolic interactionist approach reveals the
complexities involved in the interaction process, and points to the amount
of knowledge sociologists need in order to understand it. We will examine
his application of the symbolic interactionist theory to the classroom and
in particular, to teacher-pupil relations.
The scene that Hargreaves sets when applying the theory of symbolic inter-
actionism to teacher-pupil relations is that of pupils who are compelled
to come to schools where teachers wield the power to determine and enforce
their definition of the situation on pupils. Hargreaves says: 'Obviously
the teacher's first step is to define the situation ... in a way he regards
as adequate. His definition of the situation must be congruent with his
conception of his classroom role.' (40)
Hargreaves suggests that there are three general types of self-conception
which he calls 'liontamers', 'entertainers' and 'romantics'. The
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'liontamer' regards education as a process where wild and untamed pupils
have to be civilized, driven to learn what the teacher believes is good
for them, disciplined, and frequently tested. The 'entertainer' tries to
make learning interesting by engaging pupils in themes and using a variety
of audio-visual techniques and carefully contrived 'discovery methods'.
He is friendly and informal with pupils. The 'romantic' believes that it
is part of the human condition to want to learn and that his role is to
facilitate such learning. He will construct the curriculum together with
his pupils and try to establish a relationship based on trust with them.
For the 'romantic' the important thing is for the pupil to 'learn how to
1earn. '
Hargreaves insists that these three 'types' of teachers are stereotypes,
and says of them :
"They are artificial constructions, derived from actual teachers, but
the types are not to be found in this form in the real world. Each
is thus a collection of fragments of real teachers, but it would be
a disastrous mistake to think that the teaching profession can be
divided neatly into three groups." (41)
Teachers have also to fulfil the sub-roles of the 'disciplinarian' and
'instructor'. The first involves the teacher's responsibility for defining
and enforcing rules and organizin~ activities within the classroom. The
second involves determining what should be learned and how it should be
learned, and what is to be regarded as proof of learning. However, in
practice, says Hargreaves. these roles fuse together. and he suggests that
there are several ways in which teachers interpret and perform these two
basic sub-roles. (42)
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An important implication of Hargreaves' discussion of sub-roles is that
a teacher is not totally free to define the situation as he wills. Constraints
and expectations force him to include in his self-conception the functions
of disciplining and instructing. Thus when we want to understand the inter-
action of teacher and pupil, we must bear in mind that the individual's con-
ception of his role is only a part of what has to be considered. (43)
Hargreaves makes a significant point when he says that a teacher's self-
definition implies an ideal pupil role which is congruent with and supportive
of the self-definition. A teacher may not expect a pupil to conform to his
ideal pupil, and he may find that he is forced to adopt roles different to
his ideal by the way pupils respond to him. Pupils who adopt the ideal
role are defined as 'good·; those who do not are 'bad'. Conformity to
the disciplinary and instructional aspects of the teacher's sub-roles are
important factors in judging pupils. Hargreaves states that:
"we can say that the teacher defines the situation in terms of his own
roles and goals, especially as they relate to his instructional and
disciplinary objectives, and assigns to the pupils roles and goals that
are congruent with his own. He selectively perceives and interprets
pupil behaviour in the light of his definition of the situation. On
the basis of further interaction with the pupils and repeated perceptions
of them, he develops a conception of individual pupils (and classes)
who are evaluated, categorized and labelled according to the degree
to which they support his definition of the situation. He then responds
to pupils in the light of these evaluative labels." (44)
It is difficult for teachers to recognize and understand the complex attitude
that pupils exhibit. According to Hargreaves, it is most important for pupils
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to please the teacher. This involves considerable skills in balancing out
pleasing the teacher with the need to get approval from friends. In other
words, a pupil has to have a set of skills to meet the expectations of the
teacher and a set of strategies which "will allow him to depart from these
regulations without incurring disapproval or to give the impression that
he is meeting the expectations when he is unable or unwilling to do." (45)
Hargreaves feels that pupils do not really want to please the teacher but
feel that they have to do it. He notes that teachers often fail to see
that pupils are, in fact, putting on a front. Teachers discourage the expression
of real feelings such as boredom and frustration in pupils by telling them
to 'pay attention' or to 'stop messing about,' Providing the teacher with
the right answer is an important way to please him, but often this involves
a 'recipe ' where no 'real' learning is required e.g. in mathematics, a pupil
can develop ways of getting the right answer without really understanding
tRe problem.
He mentions alternatives to pleasing the teacher and uses as an example
the delinquent who substitutes pleasing the teacher with the goal of annoying
the teacher. (46) The delinquent can in other situations adopt an attitude
of 'expedient compliance.' The pupil who is not concerned about pleasing
the teacher but who does so in order to avoid trouble, adopts what Hargreaves
calls the alternative of 'indifference.'
After dealing with the teachers' and pupils' definitions separately, Hargreaves
then brings them together in his analysis of their interaction.
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A state of 'concord' exists when teachers' and pupils' definitions are
congruent, and a state of 'discord' exists when the definitions are incom-
patible. However, Hargreaves says that a state of 'pseudo-concord' exists
in most classrooms where the definitions of situations are partly
compatible. Pupils do have some power to resist the imposition of a definition
on them. Teachers and pupils therefore have to 'negotiate' and modify their
demands. A variety of categories are used by both teachers and pupils
to promote their own definition or to modify the others' views. Hargreaves
says that among the teachers' 'negotiative techniques' are the use of promises
and threats, appeals to higher authority such as the principal of the school,
divide and rule etc. Among the pupils' techniques we also find appeals to
authority ('my mum says'), appeals to justice, attrition etc. A reasonably
orderly classroom results from the interplay of strategies, and a shared
understanding of what is going on, results.
Hargreaves' belief that the state of 'pseudo-concord' is the typical situation,
implies that the process of negotiation is a continuous one. He clearly
states that the classroom is a place of conflict - teachers and pupils try
to impose their definitions of the situation on one another and devise
techniques and strategies in order to achieve their goals. Hargreave's ideas
have provided us with a clear and intelligible approach to the analysis of
teacher-pupil relations and indicate to us that the interpretive approach
can be used to develop a better understanding of the classroom and school.
In order to clarify the role of the researcher in the analysis of inter-
personal relationships, we need still to examine some studies about teachers
and pupils which have been conducted using the micro interpretive approach.
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We feel that this clarification is essential since many questions remain
unanswered e.g. Should the researcher be a detached, unbiased observer?
Is it possible to describe without interpreting? How is the relation of
education to such things as the economy brought about in the interaction
process?
(ii) Martyn Hammersley (47)
Under the heading 'definition of the teacher's role,' Hammersley suggests
that teachers' perspectives can be seen to be composed of several aspects
which can be further subdivided - teachers may consider that there is a
special expertise to teaching which ordinary people do not have (authoritative
role) or teachers may regard teaching skills as something that all people
have (no distinct role); they may consider themselves to be experts in
areas of knowledge (curriculum) or in teaching method (method); the teacher
may regard his role to be one of developing the whole child (wide) or he
may be concerned with teaching a specific skill or subject (narrow); teachers
may feel that they have to control many aspects of pupils behaviour (high
control) or allow pupils a great deal of freedcm (low control); the same
criteria may be used to judge all pupils (universalistic) or pupils may be
judged according to age, background, ability etc. (particularistic); and teachers
may see ~nowledge as a given body of facts which have to be mastered (product)
or they may concern themselves primarily with the processes of thinking (process),
Ha~ersley suggests that in the teacher's 'conceptualization of pupil action',
teachers may regard pupils as adults, or as pupils who have special rights
because they are young, or consider that pupils are learning to become adults
but do not have all adult rights and responsibilities. Teachers may regard
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pupils as being determined by inheritance or background in what they do,
or children may be understood as having free will and thus deserving
praise or blame (individualistic).
TABLE 4.3 : HAMMERSLEY'S TYPOLOGY
Definition of the teacher's role
a) authoritative role .-. no distinct role
b) curriculum .--. method
c) narrow .--+ wide
d) high degree of teacher control ---- ~low control
e) universalistic ~--. particularistic
f) product 4--+ process
2 Conceptualisation of pupil action
a) licensed child 4--. apprentice adult· ---- adult
b) individualistic ~--. deterministic vocabulary of motives
c) pessimistic 4--. optimistic theory of human nature
3 Conceptualisation of knowledge
a) distinct curriculum 4--. no distinct curriculum
b) knowledge objective and universally valid knowledge
personal and/or tied to particular purposes or cultures
c) hierarchical structure .--~ no hierarchy
d) discipline-bound 4--. general
4 Conceptualisation of learning
a) collective ~--. individual
b) reproduction ~--. production
c) extrinsic .--9 intrinsic motivation
d) biological ~--9 cultural learning path
e) diagnosis 4--. pupil intuition
f) learning by hearing about ~--. learning by doing
5 Preferred or predominant techniques
a) formal ~--~ informal organisation
b) supervision and intervention ~--. participation and non-
intervention
c) imperative mode plus positional appeals 4--+ personal appeals
d) class tests 4--~ assessment compared to past performance
~--. no formal assessment
e) grouping 4--+ no grouping
f) grouping by age and ability 4--. random, friendship or
pupil-choice grouping
SOURCE M. Hammersley, 'Teacher Perspectives ' , Unit 9 of E202, .Schooling and
society (Open University Press, Milton Kevnes, 1977), p. 37.
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It is clear that teachers have a variety of subjective understandings about
their job. In trying to elicit these subjective understandings, it is
interesting to note that Hammersley groups the views of teachers into sub-
headings like 'definition of teacher's role' and 'conceptualisation of knowledge.
This indicates that part of the sociological researcher's job is to organize
and describe the various aspects of the teacher's subjective outlook. It
also indicates that the sociologist has to make sense of the way actors
make sense of the world, by selecting and shaping what he presents. At the
same time, he has to remain true to the actor's subjective understandings.
Hammersley is obviously of the opinion that it is necessary to place the
actor's meanings into a typology in order to clarify them.
( ii i ) Peter Woods (48)
Woods tries to bring together in an organized way the different pieces of
research about pupils' views of schooling. He focuses on how the context
of action is defined; 'the frameworks through which people make sense of
the world'; and on cultures including beliefs, values, speech patterns
and forms of understanding. (49) He suggests that perspectives which are
derived from cultures are linked to action through 'strategies'.
Operating with a 'conflict model of the school', he sees the school situation
as one where a continuous process of negotiation takes place between teachers
and pupils who have rather different personal aims. (50) It is within this
'conflict' framework, Woods suggests, that pupils develop cultures which then
giver rise to perspectives.
Woods notes that several studies have identified a pro-and anti-school culture
in secondary schools which are vaguely related to social class. l'Iiddle-class
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children who are successful in education are usually pro-school. Gender
also affects the response of boys and girls to school subjects. However,
Woods points out that "individuals do not slavishly follow sub-cultural
norms, nor imprint masculinity or femininity upon themselves without reflection.
They do have choices." (51) It becomes essential then to find some way
of conceptualizing pupils' personal interests. Woods developed a model
of pupil adaptations where he suggests eight possible modes of adaptation
ingratiation, compliance - optimistic and instrumental - ritualism, oppor-
tunism, retreatism, colonisation, intransigence and rebellion. Inhis chart
below, he outlines what he considers to be the predominant forms of adaptation.
TABLE 4.4 : WOODS'S MODES OF ADAPTATION
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SOURCE P. Woods, Sociology and the School. An Interactionist Viewpoint
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In the early years, pupils have a positive attitude towards the goals and
means of the school. In their fourth and fifth years they are divided into
examination and non-examination forms, and develop either towards a conformity
mode or a dissonance mode. The instrumentally compliant regard what they
are doing as useful to get a job. Ritualism implies that pupils identify
with the means, but are indifferent to the school's goals. In the dissonance
mode, the retreatist is either indifferent to or rejects the means and goals
of the school. He finds no substitute goals and is the bored pupil who
'messes about' to pass the day. The intransigent pupil is indifferent to the
goals and detests the means. He disrupts lessons, misbehaves in public
and adopts the styles of sub-cultural groups such as the skinheads. The
rebellious pupil also rejects the goals and means but substitutes his own
goals. (52) H~ is not seen to be as great a threat as the intransigent pupil.
We see thus that in his attempt to elicit pupils' views of their role or
pupil self-conceptions, Woods notes the influence of class and gender factors
and then tries to explain the various self-conceptions which develop by
examining the pupils' reaction to the official aims and means of the school.
A major methodological point raised by Woods' research is that an observer's
role involves attempts to classify and define actors' definitions of goals.
4.4.1.2 Ethnomethodology and Educational Research
As we have noted in Chapter 3, the ethnomethodologists emphasize a 'subjectivist'
approach and regard the understanding of meaning as essential. A distinction
is made between 'topic' and 'resource' and when applied to the social world,
the topic is a piece of interaction, and the resource refers to what people
use to make sense of the interaction. It follows then that the researcher
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who is also a member of society, has to use his own resources in order to
make sense of the interaction he observes, and in doing so, may distort
the way that the actors make sense of their interaction. If his intention
is to grasp the resources of the actors, he has to put to one side his
own resources.
Actors do not see every piece of interaction separately, but link them
together by using 'methodic practices'. The ethnomethodologist is interested
in how actors link each interaction together in order to make sense of them.
Language is very important in this linking process. Since any word can have
several meanings, ambiguities can arise in sentences. These can be reduced
by the actors' understanding of the context. 'Indexicality' is the procedure
of relating context to meaning. Among the methodic procedures used by hearers
to make sense of the event are the following:
Retrospective methods - actors take present meaning and relate it to remembered
past events to make sense of it.
Prospective methods - members assume that what follows will clear up
ambiguities.
ReZating peopZe to categories which exist in the culture. Examples of
categories are teacher, pupil, policeman, priest. Associated with these
categories are rights and duties. Since people can be placed in many cate-
gories, the speaker has to 'membership' himself and his hearers i.e. he has
to indicate the categories of himself and his hearers.
(i) George Payne
We will now examine briefly an ethnomethodological analysis of the classroom
by George Payne. (53) Payne analyses the first few sentences in a lesson in
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order to show how the lesson is created. The first sentence is
Teacher E:r ... come o:n settle down ... no one's
sitting down till we're all ready. (54)
The order ('come o:n') indicates that membershipping is taking place. The
teacher is the one who has given the order, and the hearers (pupils), have
to obey. Thus the speaker has referred to the cultural categories of teacher
and pupil and the relationship between them. The term 'no one' reinforces
the membershipping. It is not understood as everyone in the world, but it
is made sense of by recognizing that it refers to and creates the category
'pupils'. The phrase 'till we1re all ready' includes the speaker (teacher)
in the relationship, and gives him the opportunity to decide the next action.
The word 'we' points to some future collaborative action and the pupils have
to employ prospective methodic practices to make sense of what is happening
and to link it with the events that follow.
We see then the line taken by the ethnomethodologists. It is assumed that
all events are created by the actors. The ethnomethodologist tries to unravel
the procedures through which actors make sense of their interaction.
4.5 Assessment
The functionalists and Marxists share several assumptions. Education can
be understood only when it is located within the wider society. For Uurkheim
it is society that dominates the everyday activities of teachers, pupils
and administrators; for the functionalists it is the needs of so~iety; and
for the Marxists it is the economy, the class system or ideology. It is
therefore possible to predict the outcome of education as it leads to the
maintenance of the status quo. Human beings are regarded as little more
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than products of socialization, and human creativity and human freedom are
completely ignored, as are the richness and complexity of human life. They
provide a general framework with which to analyse education, but this
framework certainly does not help us to qrasp the reality of life in schools
and to understand day-to-day classroom encounters. In short, these approaches
do not help us to understand what ~akes teachers and pupils Itick l •
The interactionists admit that the problem of observer bias is difficult
to deal with and suggest that it is impossible to enter any situation without
preconceptions or assumptio~s. The researcher must attempt to elicit the
actors' views uncontaminated by his own und remain true to the meanings and
understandings of those whom he is observing. Peter Woods writes:
"Of course we shall never be able to get into another's mind to see
exactly how it is working ... and indeed it is often difficult to
analyse our own thoughts and actions. But close observation and
sympathetic interviewing over a lengthy period - a popular time span
is a year - and in a variety of contexts can bring us close to an
appreciation of that interpretive work, that construction of meanings
that is at the heart of social life." (55)
The ethnomethodological concepts concerning everyday social reality imply
a distinctive logic of inquiry. Since the methods based on this logic are
different from ordinary sociological methods, we have to grasp the methods
and methodology of ethnomethodology in order to understand it. Points under-
lying ethnomethodological methodology include the following a claim to
a research style in line with their subject matter (56); a committment to
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investigating the 'phenomenon of everyday life' on their own terms i.e.
to respect the integrity of phenomena (57); to describe, conceptualize and
investigate what is taken for granted in daily life; inquiry into the "we
agree" implied in all social action and social settings, the "we agree"
representing an achievement of provisional unity that ethnomethodologists
adopt as a topic (58); and a dogma-free methodology with which one can
demonstrate empirically the formal properties of practical activities. (59)
Ethnomethodological methodology demands that researchers should be aware
of the part that commonsense understandings play in all inquiry and it focuses
attention on the interpretive procedures which are inherent in all inquiry.
These common-sense understandings that inform social-scientific inquiry are
incorporated into ethnomethodology. It is recognised that valid, reliable
communication with members "presupposes an understanding of their language,
their own understandings of what the people doing the observations are up
to, and so on almost endlessly." (60)
Martyn Hammersley suggests that the differences in these approaches can
be thought of in the following ways
1) In sociological research, should one assume determinism (macro),
or free will (micro)?
2) Is the goal of sociology to produce generalized explanations which
abstract from the details of social phenomena (macro), or is it to
document the process of social life in all its detail and complexity
(its 'richness' if you like)? (micro)
3) Can theories be tested against empirical data (macro), or can one
I
only judge them by their internal coherence since all data are
theory - laden (micro)?
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4) Do sociologists produce scientific theories which document what is
'really' going on while participants' views are simply myth or ideology?
(macro). Or must sociologists' accounts in some sense build upon the
interpretations of participants (micro)?
5) Can social events best be explained as the product of the structure
of national (or international) society (macro), or can valid explanations
be provided which appeal to the feptures of relatively small - scale
organizations and groups or even the characteristics of individual
people (micro)? (61)
Hammersley's distinction between macro-studies and micro-studies reflects
the opposition between the two perspectives discussed in this chapter:
the institutional (positivist) approach on the one hand, and the interactional
(interpretivist) approach on the other. The positivists emphasize the search
for generalizations and seek explanations and predictions of human behaviour.
The symbolic interactionists and ethnomethodologists view human action as
meaningful and context-bound, and the task of the researcher is to elucidate
the actors' meanings which constitute the social world.
Hammersley's views represent the traditional micro-macro dichotomy in which
the individual is seen as 'micro', and the collective as 'macro'. People
tend to think of issues as 'microscopic' problems and 'macroscopic' problems,
and believe that they ought to be treated differently, with different methods.
This attitude highlights the underlying assumption that complexity has some-
thing to do with size and scale.
Knorr-Cetina suggests that finding "sameness ll in phenomena, would facilitate
the finding of solutions. (62) Her view is indicative of a more recent
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tendency in the sociology of science which discards traditional divisions
and "received" notions of science, and is critical of the traditional micro-
macro dichotomy. For example, Bruno Latour whose approach is related to
the constructivist/contextual school of thought, has shown that the micro-
analyst, while still remaining faithful to his method, can tackle macro-
issues as well. (63)
The example Latour uses is that of Pasteur, the French scientist who tackled
the macroissue of the anthrax disease. By doing lab experiments on microbes,
Pasteur ended up modifying many details of the whole of French society. In
his example, Latour uses the inside/outside dichotomy to illustrate how society
can be modified by "displacing some actors." In doing this, he illustrates
how, through inversion of scales, macro problems can become micro problems,
and vice versa. Latour's ideas indicate strongly that research on the macro-
level does not necessarily exclude microanalysis and qualitative methodology.
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In Chapter two, our examination of the history of the philosophical founda-
tions of qualitative methodology revealed that the central debate within the
philosophy of the social sciences concerns the methodological unity of natural
and social science and that it is the so-called positivists who have dictated
the way in which this debate has been conducted. Our examination of the
history of the dialectical, phenomenological and pragmatist trends in research
methodology pointed to different conceptions of science which could be explored
as appropriate frameworks for the social sciences.
In Chapters three and four we outlined the development of symbolic interac-
tionism and ethnomethodology and their applications in educational research
and found that these interpretivist schools stress the activity of human
agents in constructing their meaning systems and negotiating 'definitions
of the situation.' It appears to us that they deny the existence of an
objective reality which the researcher can come to know since social phenomena
are essentially 'subjective' or 'value-impregnated' because of the nature
of purposive human action. Therefore any attempt to exclude subjective
interpretations inevitably also eliminates every genuine social fact.
According to this view, "non-objective" techniques of enquiry should be
developed to include the ability and willingness of the social scientist to
project himself empathetically into the phenomena he is studying and this
alone will lead him to hypotheses with real explanatory power.
In our discussionof the traditional dichotomy between the micro- and macro
123
approaches, we noted that the constructivist epistemology calls into question
the claim of so-called positivists in both the natural and social sciences
to be able to conduct "neutral" research as scientific "observers." But, we
ask, are "meaning systems ll not 1I 0u t there ll in the social world? Can they
not be captured by insightful researchers in a way that is not significantly
different from the way physicists and chemists attempt to capture structures
and processes that are alleged to be "out there ll in the physical world? These
questions make it imperative for us to examine the sociology of knowledge
which resulted in a critical reassessment of the origins of knowledge and
therefore of science (education) and consequently also of research (in education)
52 The Soc i 01 ogy of Knowl edge
The long history of the sociology of knowledge can have its origins traced
back as far as the writings of Francis Bacon, and elements of it were also
present in the works of some of the IIfounding fathers ll of sociology such as
Marx and Durkheim. Whereas the early sociologists of knowledge treated the
topic in a I general I way, modern practitioners concentrate on detailed bodies
of specific knowledge and belief. The field is characterized today by a
number of diverse approaches, aims and interpretative schemes, and the only
clear distinction that can be made is between popular belief and commonsense
or everyday language on the one hand, and systematized specialized knowledge
on the other. (1)
Krohn regards the question of the distinction between the logic of proof and
the discovery process of new knowledge as central to the sociology of Knowledge. (
This distinction emerged as a result of a division which occurred in the
historical development of science. New discoveries after the 17th century
resulted in the abandonment by the natural sciences of the scientific methods
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and styles used by the traditional academic generations. Terms such as
"insight" and "intuition" were also rejected. This exclusion of the emotional
and social dimensions of humanity resulted in the unavoidable loss of "meaning". I
The attitude that an approach should be either intuitive or empirical hindered
research in the socially determined and constructed foundations of knowledge,
and has penetrated further into the distinction between man and nature. (4)
We are still confronted today with the problem of how to investigate in a
"scientific" manner that which is considered to be a humanly relevant problem.
Mulkay notes that the central concern of sociologists of knowledge has been to
show how specialised bodies of knowledge are influenced by the social and
cultural contexts in which they are produced. (5) This concern leads immediatel)
to more specific questions such as : What kinds of social and cultural factors
exercise an influence on mental productions? What kinds of connections are
there between them? Which mental productions are open to sociological analysis?
Mulkay notes further that an examination of the areas of knowledge which have
been subjected to empirical analysis reveals that although sociological studies
of scientists and the scientific community have been done, it is only recently
that there has been the empirical investigation from a sociological perspective
of scientific knowledge and its construction. Most sociologists of knowledge
"have argued strongly ... , that the substance of scientific knowledge is
independent of social influence and they have tried to justify this assertion
on philosophical grounds. They have claimed, in short, that science is a
special sociological case because it has a special epistemological basis." (6)
,
A brief examination of some of the major contributions to the sociology of knowl
and the sociology of science reveals that this has in fact been the case -
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science has been regarded as a special sociological case. Durkheim and Marx
as mentioned before are among the major contributors in the nineteenth century
to the sociology of knowledge. Although there are important analytical





Science flourishes in large-scale industrial societies.
Scientists create distinct communities which regulate the production
of certified knowledge.
The actual content of science is independent of social influences.
Scientific research communities have special social characteristics
which inhibit the influence of distorting factors such as bias,
prejudice and irrationality on the members· technical work and are
therefore crucial in enabling scientists to generate objective
knowl edge. (7)
Karl Mannheim is regarded as a central figure in the sociology of knowledge. (8)
His sociology of knowledge involves a number of ideas taken from Marxism,
especially Marx1s notions of the lIe~istential base ll and class groupings.
By means of several empirical studies, he provided historical documentation
of the connections between thought and social factors. By combining the
Marxist notions he had adopted with elements from the German academic tradition
of neo-Kantian thought, he made a radical distinction between the methods
and concepts of the natural sciences, and those of the social sciences and
historical thought. (9)
The concepts appropriate to the study of the natural world are described as
being IItimeless and static 'l • (10) One can obtain valid knowledge about such
objective phenomena only by detached, impartial observation, by reliance on
sense data, and by accurate measurement. (11) However, a proper investigation
126
of cultural products cannot be undertaken by methods of detached observation
because an understanding of cultural phenomena involves interpretations of
participants' meanings which cannot be observed like objects in the external
world. Since each historical period and each social group has distinctive
values and meanings, the analyst begins his investigation from his own
culturally specific framework of meanings. The interpretation of meanings
must therefore deal with the unique features of each cultural epoch. (12)
Mannheim states that since there can be no detached, uniform observation of
cultural products, their meaning must be acquired by means of involvement
and sympathetic understanding. (13)
Mulkay states that the basic epistemological problem faced by Mannheim is
that of relativity. If social thought, which lies outside the exact sciences,
is relative to a particular social position and has to be investigated from
a particular perspective, then it appears that there are no general criteria
for judging the validity of each assertion. (14) More importantly, since the
sociology of knowledge is itself a part of the domain of "social thought",
there is no way in which it can assess its own claims, including its central
claim, that all social knowledge is existentially determined.
In his attempt to reject this conclusion, Mannheim had to formulate an alternati'
epistemology to show that although the cultural sciences lie outside the domain
of the exact sciences, their assertions can still provide true knowledge.
This he did by changing his conception of "objectivity". He asserted that
the "objective" conclusions about particular phenomena must be regarded as in-
complete andasthe product of a specific perspective, and, as such, open to
revision in new social situations where other perspectives come into being.
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If different observers are working within a common frame of reference,
objectivity must be conceived as the application of agreed criteria of
adequacy to particular knowledge claims. (15)
Mulkay summarises Mannheim's contributions as follows:
Mannheim had tried to restrict the scope of "positivist epistemology"
to the sphere of the natural sciences. He outlined an alternative,
"re l ational" epistemology for socio-historical, existentially determined
thought. But, by not claiming that knowledge of the physical world,
like that of the social, depends on the questions we pose and on the
socially derived perspectives of the knowers, he did not open the door
to a fully-fledged sociology of science. (16)
The uncertainty among sociologists of knowledge about the nature of science
has been explained to be "largely because sociologists of knowledge have been
unable to offer a serious alternative to the standard epistemological view
of science that they have been propelled into a position from which scientific
knowledge and the intellectual activities of scientists have to be treated
with special deference." (17)
The standard view of scientific knowledge regards the natural world as real
and objective. Science can provide an accurate account of the objects,
processes and relationships which occur in the world of natural phenomena,
because science has evolved stringent criteria to evaluate empirical claims.
The validity of the factual foundation of scientific knowledge is thus
guaranteed and devoid of subjective factors such as personal-prejudice and
self-interest which could distort scientists ' perception of the social world.
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Scientific knowledge is rooted in empirical evidence making it necessarily
independent of the society in which it was made available. Since the content
of scientific knowledge is determined by the nature of the physical world
itself, the social origin of scientific knowledge is irrelevant to its content. (
It should be evident from our discussion thus far that concepts of "knowledge"
would necessarily influence views on science. Due to this, we have to deal
with the social perspectives on science in order to look more closely at
scientific activities in education as embodied in research processes.
5.3 The Sociology of Science
Our starting point will be the nineteenth century context of Western Europe
when marked social changes were brought about by the growth of industrial
society. The basis of the modern trend of sociological thought was a response
to these changes and to the intellectual achievements of the physical and
biological sciences. Sociology was born and attempted a rigorous explanation
of the characteristics of nineteenth century European society. (19) The foundin
fathers of sociology noted that one of the ,most socially distinctive features
of industrial society was the existence of a separate community which was
intent on the pursuit of the systematic knowledge of the natural world. These
founding fathers were also concerned with establishing the legitimacy of their
own methods and with establishing the scientific nature of their intellectual
endeavours. (20)
5.3.1 The Development of the Speciality
Even though the intellectual and social importance of science was recognized,
science as a topic for substantive sociological study was neglected. (21)
One of the reasons for this neglect is that most early sociologists entered
129
the discipline from the humanities, and since most of them had no expert
knowledge of the advanced sciences, sociology and natural science were kept
organizationally apart. Merton states:
"Physical and biological scientists have typically had their rigorous
training confined to the specialized skills and knowledge of their
field~ and few have had more than a slight acquaintance with social
science. Social scientists, similarly, have typically had little
training in one or another branch of the more exact sciences or even
in the history of science, and consequently feel reluctant to take
up a specialization for which they see themselves as unprepared. In
the meantime, the sociology of science falls unnoticed between these
two academic stools."
Thus the unfamiliar technical culture of science made it difficult for socio-
logists to absorb science as an essential part of sociological research.
Drawing their conceptions of science mainly from the writings of philosophers,
they regarded scientific knowledge in crudely positivist or logical-positivist
terms. Genuine scientific knowledge was seen to have its basis on impartial
observation of the real, objective world, and was validated by the application
of universal, unchanging criteria. Consequently, genuine scientific knowledge
was regarded as independent of the social position or personal committments
of the knower. (23)
Science was treated as a special kind of social phenomenon, as a paradigm
of genuine knowledge in modern society, and was excluded from analytical
consideration, and regarded to be outside the realm of sociological analysis.
One of the reasons for this is, possibly, that it was essential for sociologists
to identify some class of knowledge-claims which was validly independent of
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variations in the social context. (24) If all knowledge-claims and all
judgements of validity are conditioned by social determinants, this would
include the claims of the sociologists as well, and sociological propositions
would no longer be accurate accounts of the real social world, but would
have to be treated merely as by-products of the sociologist's social position.
In the attempts of the major figures in the sociology of knowledge to solve
the problem of the relativity of ideas, scientific knowledge continued to
be regarded as independent of its social context. For example, Mannheim states
The particularity of the theory of knowledge holding sway today is now
clearly demonstrable by the fact that the natural sciences have been
selected as the ideal to which all knowledge should aspire. It is only
because natural science, especially in its quantifiable phases, is
largely detachable from the historical-social perspective of the
investigator that the ideal of true knowledge was so construed that
all attempts to attain a type of knowledge aiming at the comprehension
of quality are considered as methods of inferior value. (25)
Since the work of many sociologists was modelled on this privileged epis-
temological status of scientific knowledge, sociologists could present their
own (supposedly scientific) claims as open to objective test and independent
of social influences, and thus avoid the danger of their own self-refutation.
They regarded forms of "knowledge" \vhich could not claim to be scientific,
as open to sociological interpretation.
The rapid growth of interest in the sociology of science during the 1960s
and the 1970s can be accounted for by changes in the wider society which was
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becoming concerned with questions of science policy. Science had projected
an image of itself as an esoteric discipline which would generate objective,
practically effective knowledge as long as it was not regulated from the
outside. (26} Since social influences could not direct the accumulation of
objective knowledge, there was no need for a systematic study of the social
aspects of science as a basis for science policy.
However, after World War 11, and especially after the date of the first
Sputnik in 1957, there were immediate calls for developing an organized,
national policy for science. Prior to Sputnik, political and admini~trative
decisions about science were made with the guidance and advice of physicists
who had been part of the Atomic Programme of World War 11 and of the scientific
elite. (27) Several factors in the t960s brought this approach to science
policy under attac~. People started to become aware that science-based
technologies were responsible for environmental damage and social disruption;
the massive expenditure on military research made the consequence of a war
between East and West even more destructive; and technological spin-offs
from scientific research were not that frequent. It became necessary to limit
the rate of growth of the scientific budgets. The idea that the scientific
community had stressed, viz. that progress of science would improve social
welfare, did not seem to be materializing. A study of the social aspects
of science by non-scientists began in this context, and was supported by
those who felt that it was now necessary to reconsider the assumptions about
the nature of science.
In the United States, Robert Merton, one of the most influential scholars
in the functionalist tradition, undertook empirical and analytical investigations
in the sociology of science. He had already extended the insights of Weber
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and Durkheim with respect to the social conditions which seemed essential
to the production of scientific knowledge, and proceeded with his research
by means of quantitative evidence using the same frame of reference provided
by the traditional sociology of knowledge to "prove" that the social structure
of science was in fact "organized in accordance with that kind of universalistic
ethos which Merton had taken to be a pre-requisite for the creation of objec-
tively certified knowledge." (28)
However, in Western Europe, the sociology of science developed along different
lines. German historians never deviated too far from hermeneutics and the
concept of "meaning". This provided a strong anti-positivist base, and a critica
stance was adopted towards the Mertonian approach, and these sociologists were
bent on redefining the framework of analysis within which the sociology of
science should proceed. Their task was made easier by the availability of
the work of Thomas Kuhn which they took as their main point of departure.
Whereas Merton had made a definite distinction between the cognitive and
social processes of science, Kuhn's work implied the possibility of alternative
epistemological assumptions. Merton's work did not explore cognitive processes
and products themselves, whereas Kuhn's ideas implied that the cognitive,
social and moral aspects of science were linked together in a complex way.
European sociologists who were doubtful of the value of functional analysis
aAd quantitative methods of examining the connection between cognitive and
social processes, felt that Kuhn's work made possible analytical issues which
were not possible in the Mertonian school. Kuhn had supplied a flexible
interpretative resource for investigations of the social production of scientific
knowledge.
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5.3.2 The Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge
The Trend Report by Michael Mulkay mentions two dominant schools of thought
in the sociology of science. These two schools are labelled an institutional
and an interactional approach respectively. Ben-David described the difference
as follows:
"Authors using the interactional approach observe the way scientists
act toward each other, such as their division and co-ordination of
work in laboratories, patterns of scientific quotations and habits
of consultation. The institutional approach relates science to
variables that, from the point of view of individual scientists,
are given; examples of these variables are the definition of the
scientists' roles in different countries, the size and structure
of scientific organizations, and different aspects of the economy,
political system, religion and ideology." (29)
According to Ben-David, no attempt had been made until 1970 to interpret
the production of scientific knowledge from an interactional perspective.
The institutional perspective was stronger and had tried to establish syste-
matic connections between broad social factors and the cognitive content of
science. He outlines his views on the relationship between scientific know-
ledge and philosophical thought. (30) He contends that the institutional
approach to analysis of scientific knowledge tries to establish the 'social
determination of science. 1 To do this, it has to show that there is a
systematic relationship between the conceptual structure of philosophies
prevailing at particular times and variables of the social situation; and
it has to show also that there is a systematic relationship between those
philosophies and scientific ideas. He emphasizes that for such sociological
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analysis to be satisfactory, it has to demonstrate that both these rela-
tionships are regular and systematic.
The following passage illustrates the argument Ben-David uses to conclude
that the relationship between science and philosophy is not systematic:
"In the same period when holistic philosophies seemed to provide
inspiration for new thinking in physics, the sciences of biology
and chemistry were more fruitfully inspired by atomistic philosophies.
This shows that the question of which philosophy was or was not useful
to scientific growth depended on (a) the state of the particular science
and not some common underlying state of social affairs or spiritual
culture and (b) the discernment of the scientists in using the philo-
sophical ideas in contexts determined by the problems inherent to
their scientific specialities." (31)
He continues his argument along the lines that scientists borrowed points
of views or hunches from the philosophies in terms of their usefulness in
the solution of specific scientific problems, and not for any socially
determined perspective or motive, and thus did not adopt philosophical systems.
Thus, even though he accepts the existence of connections between science
and philosophy, he feels that these connections are irregular and unpredictable.
However, others have argued that if we wish to understand such connections,
it is essential that we deal with the kind of variable elements identified
by Ben-David, and take into account' both the cognitive and social dynamics
of specialized areas of scientific endeavour and the social relationships
which link scientists to external cultural resources. (32) Attempts have
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been made since the 1970s to explore how the production of scientific
knowledge can be interpreted in sociological terms e.g. the "strong programme"
as advocated by Barry Barnes and David Bloor. (33)
Barnes understands knowledge to mean "accepted belief" and not "correct
belief." (34) The class of beliefs which scientists accept as true should
not be given a special sociological status. The task of the sociologist of
knowledge is to show how people come to accept certain ideas as true
and others as false. In the analysis, judgements about the validity of
these ideas must not be introduced. Bloor states that the sociology of
scientific knowledge must be "impartial with respect to truth and falsity,
rationality or irrationality, success or failure. Both sides of these dicho-
tomies will require explanation." (35)
Barnes' main points can be summarized as follows: Most of the beliefs
which constitute accepted scientific belief are theoretical i.e. they are
not entirely the product of experience (36); the very meaning of scientific
terms is established by their place in a theory; and factual statements
acquire their meanings in terms of particular theoretical orientations. Without
being able to construct a systematic and empirically detailed alternative
to the simplistic versions of the institutional determination of scientific
knowledge, Barnes offers a general guide to further empirical investigation
when he states that ideas are to be regarded as "tools with which social
groups may seek to achieve their purposes in particular situations ... ideas
are related to social structure by examining the perceived situation of
actors in particular collectivities, and their perceived problems and aims.
Beliefs which "work" in one situation may be quite inappropriate in another.
The connection between interests and ideas is contextually mediated." (37)
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Bloor writes that "the sociology of knowledge must locate causes of beliefs,
that is, general laws relating beliefs to conditions which are necessary and
sufficient to determine them." (38)
Although Barnes and Bloor both equate all forms of adequate explanation
with causal (deterministic) analysis, it must be conceded that they do place
stress upon actors' reasons and interests on men's active construction of
their social world.
At this stage in our discussion on the social construction of scientific
knowledge, it would be appropriate to examine a few of the recent case
studies of scientific development which draw attention to features that in-
dicate that there is no clear separation in science between the negotiation
of social meaning and the assessment of knowledge-claims.
5.3.2.1 Empirical Studies of Scientific Development
Some of the recent case studies are based on "observing" groups of scientists
in their laboratories over long periods e.g. the study conducted by Karin
Knorr-Cetina who belongs to the so-called "constructivist" or "contextual"
school of thought. (39) Knorr-Cetina emphasizes that science cannot be
understood primarily on the level of ideas. Scientists are engaged in research
practices which occur in, and are linked to, specific organizational contexts.
If we want to understand how scientific knowledge-claims are produced, we have
to take into account these practices and organizational contexts. She con-
tends that when we observe scientific research practice, it is inappropriate
to portray scientists as "subjecting descriptive hypotheses to objective
test." She observes further that:
" when looking at actual laboratory practice, it becomes clear
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that the stakes are not defined in terms of the correspondence-
theory of truth Instead, the process of inquiry appears to be
constructive; that is, oriented towards 'making things work '
successfully and embedded in a reality which is highly artificial
and essentially self-created. In contrast to truth, success has
a definite meaning for the individual scientist 11 (40)
Knorr-Cetina claims that 'success l to the individual scientist means using
opportunities which arise out of routine research practice to contribute to
the professional literature. ~ientists have therefore to produce a distinctive
research product. A scientist might recognise the possibility of producing
an original result through an unexpected observation, or while talking to
colleagues or reading a research paper. She will then, using local resources
and competences, engage in a relatively long period of sustained 'tinkering '
during which she will try to 'make things work ' to her own satisfaction.
Colleagues will often discuss ongoing research with the individual scientist
and with the group, but this must not be seen as application of universal,
impersonal criteria of adequacy to the research in question because each
research locale seems to develop its own technical culture. Knorr-Cetina
explains that IIWhat is of interest here is a phenomenon almost completely
ignored in the literature on science: research sites develop local interpre-
tations of the scriptures, an exegetical know-how referring to what is meant
and how it ought to be translated into practice." (41)
The end-product of much of such opportunistic scientific research has a
strong personal flavour because of its dependence on the unique situations
of particular scientists working in local variants of a research tradition,
but very few obvious traces of a personal dimension are allowed to remain
in the formal research paper.
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Knorr-Certina is of the opinion that if a scientist wants to achieve
the success of publication, her research paper must be distinctive. She
can achieve this by identifying and investigating a topic which has not
been explored in literature. Alternatively, scientists can strive for what
Knorr-Cetina calls 'discriminant value' i.e. they publish findings that
negate or modify a prior claim. Such distinctive products of scientists
with this 'discriminant value' have the "power to discriminate both in the
sense of distinguishing between the new product and those relevant in an
existing area, and in the sense of recZassifying the latter as inferior, out-
dated, or holding only under special conditions." (42) Thus, what scientists
see as opportunities for success, and the knowledge - claims they produce,
is influenced to a great degree by their variable readings of existing litera-
ture. (43) When a scientist identifies a new topic, she avoids making claims
which resemble too closely already published work; when shecontrasts her finding~
with some other published work, she tries to provide a background from literaturE
for her-- negation or modification of that work. However, Knorr-Cetina suggests
that the existing corpus of results can be used with great flexibility. She
sees it as a resource for "metaphorical reasoning" which researchers use to
transfer techniques, observations and interpretative notions in a creative
endeavour from one problem to another. There is therefore, little concern
with cross-checking others' claims, because if the claims are merely replica-
tions of prior results, they are usually not published.
Despite the formal appearance of products which make up research literature,
they are not merely simple descriptive accounts about observed regularities
which are accessible to all competent investigators and which can be checked
and sanctioned by them. Knorr-Cetina stresses that these products of research
are variable and anarchic
"Furthermore, most publ ished results cannot be easily re-generated,
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or validated - a fact which may be surprising to the outsider.
Hence what is selected will not depend on the evaluation of a product
in itself; instead it depends on whether a result fits into the
framework of a current undertaking and works out successfully in
instrumental manipulation." (44)
Knorr-Cetina1s argument can be summarized as follows
Scientists are not concerned with measuring their products against objective
criteria, or with identifying valid contributions and testing the claims
of others, but seek instead to identify products or aspects of products which
they find useful for their own research purposes. Products that do receive
special attention are those which can be made to Iwork ' by numerous researchers
who are each involved with their own specific research. In fact, most
products are ignored. The scientist who produces a successful item will
earn sufficient credit which sets in motion a self-reinforcing process. As
a result of this, he attains increased access to research facilities, and
thus to opportunities to generate and pursue more opportunities for successful
sc i ent ifi c work.
Knorr-Cetina's study is based on direct observation of scientists in local
research sites and, as such, offers limited insights into the dynamics of
research networks. However, it is interesting to note that almost all studies
of research networks that have been done reach conclusions which are compatible
with her analysis. As an example we will look briefly at a study done by
Harry Collins, whose approach is classified as the "Bath School". (45) This
case study concerns research into gravitational waves in which Collins tries
to show how scientific belief is a contingent outcome of social negotiation. (46;
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Collins concludes that the debate over competing claims was greatly influenced
by social factors and personal choices. Established knowledge and formal
criteria did not provide a means of distinguishing valid from invalid claims.
Participants agreed that Einstein's general theory predicted gravitational
waves, that certain catastrophic astrophysical events should release such
waves, that a certain kind of observational apparatus was required, and that
there was a need for controlled experiment and for theoretical interpretation
consistent with the experimental evidence. However, consistent with Knorr-
Cetina's views of scientific production, it was found that most of the
participants were fundamentally uncertain about how they could demonstrate
the existence of gravitational waves. The network itself was greatly divided
about the meaning of its members' experiment~l results. Collins demonstrates
that there was no common assessment of experimental procedures and results
e.g. what one scientist found impressive, was said to be interesting by another,
and dismissed as an outright fraud by yet another. Nobody attempted to repeat
in detail the original experiment since there was no point in duplicating
a result which had no scientific meaning. Scientists seemed more concerned
with finding a new kind of observation which would be recognized as a more
competent measure of gravitational waves. Collins suggests that the parti-
cipants, in believing that they were checking the original knowledge-claim
and the findings on gravitational waves, were only doing so indirectly by
entering into "negotiations about the meaning of a competent experiment." (47)
For replication to be useful as a criterion for assessing knowledge-claims,
there has to be agreement about the adequacy of experimental procedures,
the meaning of observations, etcetera. In other words, replication is only
useful as a criterion after much cognitive consensus is reached. Replication
can occur only when participants have decided what can count as reliable
and equivalent observations. This was not possible in the field of gravitationa
waves.
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Collins ' views of the cognitive negotiation in his study are consistent
with Knorr-Cetina's emphasis on opportunism, cognitive variability and on
the idiosyncracies from which much of the distinctive value of scientific
products are derived. Some of the general assumptions which the participants
appear to share and which they brought to the study of gravitational waves,
include varied interpretative resources as Einstein's theory and belief in
experimental methods. Even though the participants see a limited range of
empirical variables as related, they interpret them differently and employ
them selectively in arguments on the basis of the knowledge-claims favoured
by the various participants. It therefore appears that each scientist had
first committed himself to a particular line of interpretation, and then
selected from the repertoire the resources which could be made to work in
support of that interpretation. Thus particular researchers use their
expertise and the available technical culture to support their own claims.
No clear distinction is made between technical and non-technical criteria
of evaluation by those involved, and participants say that the merit of
knowledge - claims depends on personal considerations such as the experimenter's
reputation, his access to 'inside information ' , his capabilities, honesty,
social location etcetera.
The social and technical culture of science appears to provide members with
flexible symbolic resources. These are used to devise a number of interpre-
tative positions in connection with a common research problem. Through the
processes of symbolic interpretation and negotiatio~ the meaning of the orthodox
cultural repertoire is re-established in each emergent field. Collins states
that "any consensus which ensues is conceivable only as a socially organized
upshot of contingent courses of linguistic, conceptual, and social behaviour:' (~
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Consensus has to be reached before a knowledge-claim can enter the realm
of certified knowledge. An interesting case study done by Brian Wynne on
Barkla and the J phenomenon, gives us some insight into the nature of
scientific consensus. (49)
Wynne's central claim is that scientific consensus, and consequently
scientific knowledge, is not achieved by means of conclusive proof and
disproof. Even though intellectual committments are made regularly, they
are not achieved by the application of any set pre-established formal criteria.
The adoption or rejection of research programmes is influenced by the local
interests and traditions of research practice of the scientists. The contin-
gent character of scientific consensus can be observed when in the event of
being threatened, scientists bolster their cognitive committments by means
of rhetorical devices.
Barkla and Compton had both researched the J phenomenon which concerned a
new set of X-ray emissions, the IJ radiations ' , which emanated from the
electrons of a specific 'shell I or series in the atom. (50) Physicists
were generally agreed about the inadequacy of Barkla's work and the validity
of Compton1s. Critics of Barkla attempted to replicate his work using
different research techniques on the grounds that Barkla's methods were
unreliable. Barkla did not consider the results of these critics to have
any bearing on the validity of his findings because the research techniques
employed by his critics excluded that very technical element which he
regarded as essential and as such, was not a replication of his work. (51)
A number of non-technical tactics were used by Barkla's critics in their
attempts to maintain the existing consensus. They tried to undermine his
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professional credibility by accusing him of sticking to an out-of-date
theory. Barkla's competence was questioned by drawing attention to a
mistake made by two of his students. Wynne maintains that Barkla1s
claims were never conclusively disproved.
Wynne argues that most scientists had become committed to a research practice
based on the spectrometer which inclined them towards Compton1s theory and
away from Barkla1s style of work and thi~king. The spectrometer turned out
to be a productive source of precise routine measurements, as did Compton's
theory, and this made possible widespread agreement at both practical and
interpretative levels. Barkla, however, threatened this consensus because
of several reasons not only was he an eminent physicist and Nobel Prize
winner and head of a major department, but he had, using radically different
techniques and terminology, been consistently productive over a long period
of time. His work indicated in a most disturbing fashion, that the current
orthodoxy was open to question by a man of established scientific repute.
Although a widespread belief was formed among physicists that Barkla's work
was shown to be conclusively wrong, Wynne maintains that an examination of
the records reveals that there was no such firm refutation. But, a highly
selective employment of cultural resources, both technical and 'social l ,
served to undermine Barkla's work and reputation. Believing in the idea
of the 'conclusive refutation', enabled scientists to continue believing
in the traditional versions of scientific reality.
An important implication of Wynne's study is that scientific consensus must
be seen as both socially and intellectually constructed.
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5.3.2.2 Synthesis of main points emerging fro~ the case studies
The three case studies which we have discussed indicate a line of approach
which treats scientific belief as a contingent outcome of social processes.
The formal criteria e.g. replicability, are seen to acquire meaning through
the informal committments of scientists which derive from participants'
involvement in practical traditions. Scientific knowledge - claims are
seen as inherently inconclusive. Particular claims are advocated on the
basis of scientists' position in a social setting. Thus, in addition to formal
demonstration based upon evidence, agreement is reached through informal
negotiation in which non-technical and 'social I considerations play an impor-
tant part. Traditional versions of scientific rationality exist within the
research community itself, but are adopted by scientists only in certain
circumstances, e.g. when they want to present specific knowledge-claims as
definitive. (52)
Thus it can be concluded that the impersonal debates which take place in the
formal context of professional journals are given their full meaning by, and
can only be understood, in terms of their relation to the variable processes
of interpretation and negotiation which occur in less formal contexts.
Many social-scientists have made a distinction between the context of discovery
and the context of verification, the central idea being that the nature of
social action, normative regulation and cognitive control when scientists are
producing their results, differs radically from that when they are verifying
their results. (53) It is contended that unlike the production of claims
which may be socially and/or psychologically contingent, the process of
validation is a separate social phase or context which involves the transfe-
rence of scientific results from the private domain of the individual
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researcher to the public of the research community where these results
are handled in a highly impersonal manner:
"0bjectivity enters science ... through the process by which theories
are tested, justified or judged. Those processes do not, or at least
need not, involve subjective factors at all. They can be governed
by a set of (objective) criteria shared by the entire group competent
to judge." (54)
The unsatisfactory nature of this conception of social contexts in science
has been made clear by the case studies we have discussed. Research networks
are composed of numerous members each being at different points during the
entire sequence from initial conception to dissemination and response, and
one can therefore not separate these contexts. Our case studies have also
shown that a researcher's attempts to construct his own claims colours his
view of the knowledge-claims of others. He does not, when judging the work
of others, put aside his own research practices, social interests and inter-
pretative convictions. Indeed, these factors contribute to moulding the
collective assessment of knowledge-claims.
The traditional conception of the two distinct contexts in scientific
research, viz. the context of discovery and the context of verification, raises
several interesting questions why is the content of scientific discourse
so misleadingly limited when recent studies have shown clearly that the
creation of scientific knowledge is actually a variable and contingent process?
Why does terminology used in formal scientific discourse either hide from
view or eliminate the personal, social and contingent elements?
Although the cases discussed, and particularly Knorr-Cetina's work, provide
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a detailed description of scientific conduct, Knorr-Cetina's statement:
"as befits the nature of the study, each example stands as an illustration
of others of its kind," points out that as much of the empirical material
upon which these analyses are based are inaccessible to the reade~ we have
to take much of the analysis on trust. (55) Mulkay suggests that even though
the conclusions of these case studies should be treated as tentative, they
cannot be ignored, since the evidence produced in these and similar studies
demandsfurther analysis and empirical investigation. (56) For example,
it would be more enlightening if in future, analysts active in this field,
can give us full empirical documentation for each of their claims by greater
involvement in empirical research. Then, the danger of the observer/participant
observer of construing his findings as he wishes with the reader being unaware
of much of the interpretative work being carried out, would be greatly
diminished.
In our discussion on the sociology of knowledge and the sociology of science,
we have distinguished between two dominant competing traditions - broadly
categorised as the "standard" philosophical view of science (positivist) and
the constructivist (interpretivist) respectively. We will now turn our
attention to research within education which can be seen to fit into one of
these two categories.
5.4 Research in Education and the Positivist and Interpretivist Traditions
of Epistemology
The positivist epistemological position seeks generalizations, prediction
and control in its explanations of social behaviour. (57) The interpretivist
position into which much of the "new" sociology of education fallS, suggests
that the researcher's task is to elucidate the way in which the social world
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is constituted by actors· meanings, and it challenges the claim of positivists
in both the natural and the social sciences that researchers can conduct
II neu tral ll research as scientific "observers".
We ask the following question: Is it possible for the educational researcher
to be ·objective' in his observation in his attempt to grasp the reality of
the phenomenon he is researching? We will attempt an answer by outlining
the two epistemological positions mentioned above, and comparing them.
The objectivist position is indicated in many current textbooks in the field
of educational research as the following passages illustrate:
(i) "Research may be defined as the application of the scientific method
to the study of a problem ... research is universally a systematic
and objective search for reliable knowledge. ... when the scientific
method is applied to educational problems, educational research is
the result." (58)
(ii) "Educational research is ... objective in its collection, analysis
and evaluation of data." (59)
(iii) "Educational research involves objective measuremenL" (60)
These passages reflect the objectivist standpoint that for evidence to be
objective, there has to be a clear separation between the researcher and
the phenomenon he is researching. Subjective response on the part of the
researcher is totally dpposed. It is assumed that it is possible, as
Cunningham states, "for the descriptions and explanations of a subject
matter to reveal the actual nature of that subject matter ... as they
exist independently of an enquirer1s thoughts and desires regarding them." (61)
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While not denying the possibil ity of an ontological separation between the
researcher and the object of research, the constructivist does not see this
viewpoint as significant for epistemology as he believes that it is impossible
to have an epistemological separation between the researcher and the object
of research. For example, Piaget states that" it is impossible to talk
about objectivity or object without referring back to the previous condition
of cognitive organization." (62) Piaget therefore sees knowledge as an opera-
tion that constructs its objects and as an interpretative activity in which
we can come to know only constructed realities and not independent realities. (63:
There can be different perceptions of the "same" phenomenon since we have
different cognitive schemes. Thus, what we can come to know in research
is the product of an interaction between the researcher and the phenomenon
he is researching which is partly constituted by the theories (conceptual
schemes) which the researcher brings into his research.
The objectivist's argument that the social and political context and
the researcher's subjective interests should not contaminate his research
activities has been rejected by Kuhn who regards feelings and interests of
researchers as an integral part of research activities. Kuhn argues that
the paradigms by which researchers try to mediate between their problems and
their solutions of these problems embody sets of assumptions, norms, and the
available instrumentation of a community of researchers at a particular time. (64
As such, theories are products of a research community in a particular social
and political context. Thus social and political factors are intrinsic to
research. Theories are influenced by the way in which we perceive the world
and our "factual" statements (i .e. the knowledge we have) are made in a
certain social and historical context. Kuhn argues that facts, through
their link with prevailing theories, are linked also with the psychological,
social, material and historical conditions of the researcher and his time.
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The objectivist view makes possible a number of interpretations of a given
"reality". The criterion used to judge one interpretation as better than
another is the extent to which it "fits" more or less closely to the way the
world "really" is. (65) Thus the concern of much research work in educational
psychology with measurement and the use of correlational and statistical
techniques indicates an epistemological emphasis on falsification and corro-
boration which rests on a correspondence theory of truth. "Fit" is used as
the criterion for judging truth. The inadequacy of "fit" as such a criterion
is highlighted by the constructivist1s view that since reality is socially
constructed, it follows that criteria of theory choice must themselves be
constructed. Hence it is not possible to have an absolute and eternally valid
criterion for choosing between alternative constructions.
In objectivist educational research, testing is seen as an instrument which
the researcher can use to measure what is already there. For example, I.Q.
and attitude tests are considered to be good to the extent that they eliminate
"experimental bias." They are then used as instruments to measure more or
less accurately an "intelligence" or an "attitude" which exists in some sense.
It is assumed that these instruments do not affect what they are measuring.
The same results can be obtained through the application of different but
reliable and valid instruments. These instruments are therefore considered
to be a means of access to the phenomenon.
This is a major point of contention between the interpretivist and objectivist
paradigms. The interactionist epistemology argues that the instruments are
part of the constructed reality of the psychologist's world. Knowledge
produced by theories cannot be separated from the theories and manipulations
which have produced it. In the constructivist/interactionist view, it is
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impossible to conduct "objective research" in the sense of revealing
"something" that is already there without it being affected by the activities
of the researchers. Bridgman states: "The object of knowledge and the
instrument of knowledge cannot legitimately be separated but must be taken
together as one whole." (66)
From our discussion thus far, we see that knowledge, while it is being
produced, is shaped by the theories and the techniques and instruments used
to produce it. Research can therefore not be objective in the sense of being
value-free.
In present society science enjoys a high status of knowledge. Empirical
science claims to separate fact from value, thus eliminating subjectivity
from scientific enquiry and making neutral research possible. These claims
of science have led to science being regarded as an activity concerned with
technical questions in respect of practical policies. Science is not concerned
with ends but with means. (67)
Fay argues that it is not possible to distinguish between means and ends
in this way
" every means is an end relative to the means required to achieve
it, so that any given course of action may be either a means or an
end depending upon the point of view which one adopts ... (so) that
even so-called "means" relfects the values of the person who
supports iL" (68)
A great deal of funded educational research is seen to be, in the above-
mentioned author's view, "technical" enquiry in which the researcher is asked
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to produce findings which make possible the achievement of "educationally
worthwhile ends." The researcher has to keep out his values so that his
findings can be used as a basis for policy decisions which have values in-
dependent of the research. The research thus has to be objective and neutral
and "scientific". However, we have noted that research embodies values
through the choice of theories.
In research in the objectivist paradigm, the interpretative nature of facts
is hidden by the view that the methods and knowledge of researchers can be
objective and neutral. In most current research, it is believed that the
"facts" which can be discovered through enquiry have an existence which is
independent of enquiry. These "facts" are "discovered" in a value-free way,
and because they are reported simply as a result of enquiry and not as relative
to and modified by particular (value-laden) frameworks of enquiry, they acquire
a permanence which they do not merit. Since educational research is used
mainly to prescribe for educational practice, this disguising of the origin
of "facts" in theories is important in the sense that people will have more
confidence in prescriptions which are based on unchanging, permanent facts.
We have less confidence in prescriptions which are based on facts considered
to be a construction of reality at a given stage in history, since such
prescriptions are changeable. The constructivist maintains that it is a serious
mistake to deny the historical and social roots of research since meaningful-
ness is inextricably bound with values.
In the light of the inseparability of meaning and value, we feel that it
is therefore necessary for us to reconsider our conception of objectivity in
a move towards recognizing that knowers and known are locked in a mutually
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determining relationship. We have to accept the subjectivity of thought.
The notion of objectivity as neutrality should be replaced with the notion
of objectivity involving self-reflection and self-criticism. Educational
researchers should be aware of the social, moral and political values which
are embedded in their theories and instrumentation as these shape and inform
their research. More importantly, they must accept responsibility for the
value-ladenness of their educational research findings.
We have outlined the different concepts of objectivity held by the positivist
and interpretivist traditions. The important social and political consequences
of educational research makes it imperative that researchers in education should
be aware that the idea of objectivity as neutrality and thus as value-free
research is theoretically inadequate. We are of the opinion that the construc-
tivist/interpretivist concept of objectivity, which is understood as critical
self-reflexivity, has definite possibilities for future responsible research
in education as it is based on a justifiable epistemology which will lead to
research which is both objective and value-laden.
We need to consider the questions of validity and replicability in educational
research. Phillipson has made the following observation about the positivist
distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification
IIConventional sociology works largely in terms of this distinction
between the two contexts; the processes by which the sociologist ini-
tially constructs an abstract view of social phenomena are viewed as
independent of the means he subsequently adopts for testing his ideas.
The means, conventional research procedures, are viewed as neutral
ways of disconfirming or supporting his ideas." (69)
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The criterion of 'replicability' is used by scientists to decide whether
or not particular empirical claims should be accepted. If empirical results
cannot be reproduced under specified conditions they are regarded as untrust-
worthy. However, Mulkay points out that "what is to count as a 'replication '
depends on scientists ' theories about the phenomena under study and on their
view of the factors which may influence the observational situation. Con-
sequently, as theoretical frameworks evolve and experimental techniques develop,
so the way in which the general criterion of 'replicability' is applied in
any given area necessarily alters." (70)
The problem we are therefore faced with concerns the validation of educa-
tional research findings. If replication is considered to be a criterion,
the replicator should not investigate the same area with the aim of gene-
rating confirmatory findings, although it is possible that research on similar
aspects can confirm findings of a previous work. Educational researchers
should be conscious of their values and the role they play in their research
when reporting their findings, and competing accounts should be judged
against one another. This brings us to the problem of relativism.
Knorr-Certina and Mulkay make a distinction between the concept of epistemic
relativism, in which knowledge is recognized as rooted in a particular time
and cultural context, and judgemental relativism in which the claim is made
that since all forms of knowledge are considered to be "equally val id", it
follows that they cannot be compared or discriminated amongst. (71) However,
the authors point out that judgmental relativism does not manifestly follow
from epistemic relativism, and one can discriminate between the different
forms of knowledge with a view to their relevance and adequacy in regard
to a specific goal.
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Hence one's choice will always be relative to socially and historically
situated interests. Mannheim had made a similar observation when he wrote
that "the very principles, in the light of which knowledge is to be
criticized, are themselves found to be socially and historically conditioned." (7
He argued that a broader epistemology recognizing the partial character of
all human perspectives would result in an epistemological position from which
one assumes "the inherently relational structure of human knowledge (just as
the essentially perspectivistic nature of visually perceived objects is
admitted without question) ... It is not intended to assert that objects do
not exist or that reliance upon observation is useless and futile but rather
that the answers we get to the questions we put to subject matter are, in
certain cases, in the nature of things, possible only within the limits of
the observer's perspective." (73) We have therefore to change our concep-
tion of objectivity.
Mannheim makes a distinction between relativism and relationism. (74)
Relativism is a consequence of the traditional concept of truth. If we
adhere to the static concept of truth as an objectivity outside man and
history, as something that exists in a metaphysical way independently of
man's thought, then we will encounter the problems of relativism. However,
if we think dynamically and historically, if we look at the relationship
between knowledge and relevance in terms of relationism, then we will see
that truth and validity are situationally determined, and that theories and
thoughts and opinions are true and valid only "for the time being." But this
poses a further problem. If knowledge is perspectivistically and situationally
determined, it is still possible to speak of objectivity in relationism?
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Mannheim is of the opinion that a new concept of objectivity will answer
this question. He emphasizes two points against the traditional static
and absolutist concept of objectivity.
(i) People in a particular historical situation can enter into a collective
"un iverse of discourse" in order to establish a collective perspective
of relevance which, because it is essentially their creation, will not
be an abstract relevance. Within this framework of reference, diverse
opinions can be tested for their truth and validity: "in so far as
different observers are immersed in the same system, they will on the
basis of the identity of their conceptual and categorical apparatus
and through the common universe of discourse thereby created, arrive
at similar results, and be in a position to eradicate as an error
everything that deviates from unanimity." (75)
(ii) It ~is also possible that opinions about relevance, although they come
from different perspectives, will be valid. It is therefore necessary
that the results of each perspective should be translated into the
others and reconciled at a more general level if we are to find a
"common denominator." When a choice has to be made between perspec-
tives, priority is given to that "which gives evidence of the greatest
comprehensiveness and the greatest fruitfulness in dealing with empirical
materials." (76) Mannheim is of the opinion that this task can be
accomplished by the "Sozial freischwebende Intelligenz", the intellec-
tuals who are not too heavily burdened by the group's interest in
their social environment. (77)
We are of the opinion that Mannheim's epistemology for social knowledge
contains elements for a new philosophy of science, and hence for research in
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education. Educational researchers will have "to reckon with situational
determination as an inherent factor in knowledge, as well as with the theory
of relationism and the theory of the changing basis of thought ... we must
reject the notion that there is a 'sphere of truth in itself' as a disrup-
tive and unjustifiable hypothesis." (78)
5.5 Conclusions and Recommendations
In stating our problem at the beginning of this dissertation, we examined
some of the characteristics of qualitative and quantitative research metho-
dology and their associated techniques of social research. We demonstrated
that there is a tendency in the debate between these two methodologies to
confuse epistemological and technical issues. In order to make research
perspectives in the social sciences clearer, we investigated the philosophical
underpinnings of the two methodologies in Chapter Two.
It emerged that the main epistemological problem in Husserlian theory is that
in the end, it had fallen prey to a so-called subjectivistic solipsism which
resulted in many controversies among disciples after Husserl. It was mainly
due to the writings of Schutz, who attempted to formulate an encompassing
explanatory theory of social conduct based on phenomenology, that solipsistic
barriers were broken : the concept of intersubjectivity served to displace
the age old subject-object problem. This displacement consequently resulted
in the spawning of many new perspectives on social research. The example
of Mead and symbolic interactionism serves to illustrate this point. The
counter-influence which Schutz and Mead had on each other, resulted in a
blending of ideas between phenomenology and symbolic interactionism. Influenced
by pragmatism, Schutz moved away from the search for the Ilessences" of the
157
11 Lebenswelt", and concentrated on social interaction within certain socio-
historic contexts, and attempted to discover meanings of actions within
these boundaries.
We remarked briefly on the subtle epistemological differences which exist
between the symbolic interactionist and ethnomethodological frameworks.
However, we also pointed out some of the similarities in these two paradigms
viz. the evidence of the concept "meaning" in both frameworks; the central
theme of the intersubjective constitution of a social reality which runs
through both perspectives; their reliance on participant observation as a
technique for social research; and the use of everyday language in the
interpretation of everyday reality.
Our examination in Chapter four of the application of the so-called "positivist",
symbolic interactionist and ethnomethodological approaches in educational resear<
served to highlight the distinction that is made with regard to micro and
macro approaches in social science research. Noting that the constructivist
epistemology calls into question the claim by the so-called positivists to
be able to conduct "neutral" research as scientific "observers", we under-
took an examination of the sociology of knowledge and the sociology of
science in order to evaluate the status of the knowledge-claims made by both
approaches.
Our study has not resulted in any conclusive findings which could solve
all the problems related to objectivity, validity and relevance in research
in the social sciences, but from what has emerged, we would like to make
the following recommendations:
1. The value of epistemological analysis ought not to be underestimated
as this will solve the problems of, for example
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confusions between technique and methodology~
epistemological discrepancies which are evident, for example,
in triangulation.
methodological confusions e.g. in South African Education,
phenomenology is often not regarded as an epistemological
position, but erroneously as a research method.
2. Instead of just teaching a number of research methods from standard
textbooks, more methodological guidance should be given to students,
with emphasis on the epistemological foundations of each.
3. We believe that there is a need for more sociological studies on
research of the type conducted by Knorr-Cetina et al as such studies
would serve to demystify scientific knowledge. Empirical studies
which have been done in the field of the sociology of science have
taught us significantly about the social character of scientific
knowledge. We are therefore of the opinion that these studies give
us a much clearer idea about the complex issues involved, and point
out the way we might proceed in resolving them.
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